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INTRODUCTION

Consumer grievances are characterized alternatively as the
result of fraudulent and deceptive business practices and as
breaches of contract and misunderstandings. The moral images of the parties and the nature of the problem are quite different in these separate ways of defining the situation, and
different responses result. If the primary problem is perceived
to be the existence of sly and predatory businessmen scheming
to defraud and deceive innocent and unwary consumers, then
a law enforcement response is appropriate. This perception of
the situation sees deviant outsiders' (the predatory businessmen) and victims (the consumers). What is called for is the authoritative pronouncement and enforcement of rules outlawing
such deviant conduct.
The definition of the problem as deviant business conduct
leads to the now common declaration that fraudulent and deceptive practices in consumer transactions are illegal.2 Jurisdictions vary as to exact proscriptions, legal sanctions, and mechanisms of enforcement. 3 All such legislative proscriptions share
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a criminal or quasi-criminal definition of the task as one of prosecuting, punishing, deterring, and preventing intentional, deviant, and normatively unacceptable conduct. 4 I shall call this
the law enforcement stance. It is act-oriented. It focuses on the
normative status and the practices of the business involved,
setting as its task the prevention of future improper practices.
While fraudulent and deceptive practices may be ethically
and legally clear-cut in theory, they are often extremely difficult to distinguish in practice from other sorts of business conduct. The facts are hard to ascertain, to interpret, and to prove.
Legally, fraud includes the element of intent. Where there is no
intent to defraud there may be a dispute, and perhaps a breach
of contract, but not fraud. Where, for example, a consumer
buys a secondhand automobile that does not work properly
and the seller refuses to repair it without charge, the distinctions among fraud, breach of warranty, and hard luck hinge
on the terms of the contract and the elusive intent of the seller.
Another basic fact is that many disputes may appear in isolation
to be misunderstandings or breaches of contract, but come into
focus as fraudulent when they are seen as parts of a pattern
of similar conduct. The classic fraudulent scheme known as
"bait and switch" is a good illustration. A store advertises a vacuum cleaner for sale at "the amazing low price" of $39.99. When
I go to buy the machine I am greeted by a helpful, friendly
salesman who shows me the $39.99 vacuum cleaner, explains
its deficiencies to me, and then aggressively urges that the $79.99
deluxe home-cleaning model is a far superior machine and a
much better deal. Viewing his argument in isolation, I might
conclude that the salesman is right. He may be helping me. If,
however, I discover that three salesmen in the store make this
approach routinely, and that the store has in stock fifty of the
$79.99 cleaners and only three of the $39.99 machines, I may
see the matter much differently. What was an ambiguous, isolated case takes its place as part of a pattern of business practice
and leads to a very different interpretation of each case that
5
makes up the pattern.
In concrete cases, the line between fraudulent and acceptable business practices is so unclear that there is a general re4 1 will not deal with the difficult question whether such sanctions do in fact
prevent such conduct. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-70
(1968); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 249-338 (1973).
-See, e.g., FTC's complaint against Sears, Roebuck & Co., N.Y. Times, July 11,
1974, at 41, col. 4.
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luctance to define particular businesses as members of a "hardcore" of serious offenders. Like other white-collar criminals,
the offenders simply do not seem like "outsiders," and the offenses do not seem significantly different from acceptable conduct. The community does not appear to take such offenses as
seriously as other types of deviance, and the law enforcement
response does not have the vitality that it has in other areas.
Thus, most states have enacted few criminal penalties for consumer fraud. Even where criminal penalties do exist they are
seldom used. There is, in short, a reluctance to define the situation in terms of serious deviance and to respond solely with
6
law enforcement.
It is not surprising that the issues take on quite another character when viewed from the perspective of the consumer. The
law enforcement response to consumer grievances adopts the
somewhat aloof perspective of the lawmaker, the law enforcer,
and society as a whole. The consumer who feels that he has
been treated unfairly may be angry and outraged at the conduct of the seller, and may demand that action be taken against
him, but his primary objective is to get help with his problem
and to obtain what he thinks is his due. In other words, the consumer focuses on his private interest in the dispute-his own
problem-not on the fact that the businessman may have acted
deviantly-which is society's problem. The consumer is usually
more interested in restitution than in retribution.
When consumers with concrete grievances approach a third
party, they are generally seeking help with their private disputes. If the institution is to respond directly to the consumer
as its client, it must adopt a stance toward the conduct of the
business very different from that of law enforcement. This
alternative response to consumer grievances is dispute settlement. It focuses not on the deviant normative quality of the
seller's conduct, but on the concrete dispute presented by a
dissatisfied buyer, on his injury, and on what can be done about
it. It is victim-oriented; it responds to the consumer's private
1
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interests in the dispute rather than the separate interest of the
state in law enforcement.
To take another example of vacuum cleaner buying, suppose that X complains that store Y advertised a "top quality vacuum cleaner at the amazing low price of $39.99," that he bought
the machine, which broke down two weeks later, and that Y
refused to repair or replace it without expense to X. From the
dispute settling perspective, one's response is to determine who
is to bear the loss and how the injury can be minimized and
remedied. The dispute settlement response does not look outside the single dispute to see if there are patterns of business
practice that ought to be condemned; it concentrates instead
upon obtaining a satisfactory resolution or adjustment of the
single dispute. This point is illustrated by the fact that the two
examples given above may have been purchases of vacuum
cleaners from the same seller in response to the same advertisement. Identifying and labeling business practices as fraudulent
is an approach to the situation different from trying to settle
each complaining customer's dispute, and leads to different
results.
These two stances may be understood as the criminal and
civil perspectives of the legal system. 7 The state has a special
independent interest in ensuring that conduct defined as criminal is met with official negative sanctions. This interest is based
upon maintenance of the moral consensus and morale of society and upon deterrence. These public interests of the state
are separate from the private interests of the parties to the dispute. The state also has an interest in promoting the just and
satisfactory resolution of private disputes, whether or not its
separate public interests are asserted simultaneously. The
proper relationship between these two stances is both a complex jurisprudential issue and a pressing practical problem of
priorities and institutional design.
This Article addresses the problem of responding to consumer grievances on several levels. The theoretical background
is discussed in Section I. This is intended as an approach to a
theory of dispute management institutions; I shall sketch a general model applicable to disputes in general, exemplified in
In some contexts this dichotomy appears between regulatory and dispute settling functions. See, e.g., Whitford & Kinball, Why Process Consumer Complaints? A
Case Study of the Ofice o] the Commissioner of Insurance o/ Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 639.
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terms of disputes concerning consumer transactions. The goal
of this general discussion is to set what then follows in the context of the array (one hesitates to call it a system) of institutions
which play a part in the function of dispute management. Sections II, III, and IV focus on a case study of a consumer fraud
bureau. Section II describes the bureau and our in-depth study
of it. Sections III and IV focus on two aspects of the bureau:
who complains to the bureau about what, and the bureau's response to these complaints. Section V attempts to place the
functioning of the consumer fraud bureau in a more general
context.
I.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Law functions both at the abstract preventive level by creating and announcing rules of conduct and at the concrete level
by ameliorating disputes and solving specific problems. Llewellyn and Hoebel have written:
Law has as one of its main purposes to make men
go round in more or less clear ways ... to channel behavior in such manner as to prevent or avoid conflict ....
But there is more to law than . . . regulation and
prevention. Law has the peculiar job of cleaning up
social messes when they have been made. Law thus
exists also for the event of breach of law and has a major
portion of its essence
in the doing of something about
8
such a breach.
The criminal law may be seen as stating the most important
norms of the society, the absolute limits of behavior which will
be tolerated, the normative boundaries of the community. It
is the business of the criminal law not only to set these limits,
but also to police these boundaries by law enforcement and
punish those who venture out past the limits, defining them
as deviant "outsiders" in order to dramatize the line between
acceptable and unacceptable conduct. 9
But even within the absolute boundaries of acceptable conduct, disputes arise and must be resolved. There are thus rules
8 K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY 20 (1941).

9 For a lucid discussion of the boundary-maintaining function of the criminal
PURITANS, Ch. 1 (1966). For other general discussions of the functions of criminal laws, see J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE
(1974); H. PACKER, supra note 4, at 9-61; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 4,
at 74-90.
law, see K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD
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of varying degrees of generality channeling acceptable conduct
to avoid disputes and setting out the proper resolution of disputes when they do arise. All of these levels of rules are implicit
in Fuller's characterization of law as the "enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules."'10
The rules of law are followed to a substantial extent without
explicit application of the force of the state. But when an active
dispute arises, various institutions may be called forth to resolve it. Institutions responding to disputes range from official
law courts to individual self-help, with a variety of public and
private community resources in between. What all of these institutions have in common is that they respond to disputes when
called into operation by a perceived breach of the rules of lawa "trouble-case," as Llewellyn and Hoebel term it." From the
dispute settlement perspective, these institutions may be analyzed, as Abel suggests, as a range of interveners into disputes. 2
It may be useful to conceptualize this array of dispute management institutions as arranged on a continuum, with the two
functions of law set out by Llewellyn and Hoebel as its end points.
At one pole of the continuum (top of Figure I) is the function
of creating and announcing rules of law to channel and regulate
behavior so as to prevent dispute. The products of this social
function are the abstract rules of law, the authoritative statement of the legal norms of the society. The most prominent
institutions which carry out this rulemaking function are legislatures, although it also is carried out by adjudicative, administrative, and executive bodies of government, and by the rulemaking bodies of private organizations.' 3 I shall call this pole
of the continuum the "formal" pole to indicate that the functions, products, and institutions at this end are those usually
associated with the formal law and legal institutions of the society; they tend to be more formal in the sense of logical pre10
Ii

L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 74 (1964).
K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, supra note 8, at 22.

12 Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAW & Soc. REv.
217 (1974). Abel suggests that characteristics of dispute intervention process ought
to be seen as continuous variables, not as either/or models. Id. 232-39.
i" For a discussion of the multiplicity of legal levels and legal systems.in society,
see M. WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT (1921), reprinted in part in M. RHEINSTEIN, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (1954); Evan, Public and Private Legal Systems, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 165 (W. Evan ed. 1962); Pospisil, Legal
Levels and Multiplicity of Legal Systems in Human Societies, 11 J. CONFL. RESOLUTION
2 (1967).
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cision, official authoritativeness, and fixed procedural routine.
At the other end of the continuum, the "informal" pole, is
the function of problem solving-doing something about specific
disputes on an ad hoc basis. Just as the abstract statement of
rules is intended to channel all behavior in general but not to
resolve any particular disputes, problem solving functions to
resolve particular disputes and normally does not result in the
statement or creation of rules. The products of the problemsolving function are resolved concrete problems; such concrete
resolutions need leave no mark on the normative structure of
rules. The purest form of this process is the problem solving
activity of the individual who has the grievance. A vast array
of informal problem solving institutions exists, some organized
and others not, some solving problems as their main activity,
others doing so only peripherally. Such institutions range from
public community resources (for example, police, social casework agencies, action lines, 14 Better Business Bureaus, lawyers
acting informally) to almost anyone to whom another might
turn for help with a problem (for example, friends, relatives,
business associates, politicians,' 5 ministers, doctors, and employers).
Between the formal and informal poles is arranged a variety
of dispute management institutions, some of which are set out
in Figure I with their functions and products. (I do not mean
to enter the continuing debate over which institutions are to
be considered legal institutions. 1 6) Many disputes which could
be resolved by the explicit, relatively formal legal institutions
are in fact resolved by much less formal problem solving institutions. It is this commonality of function that forms the basis
for consideration of these informal institutions on the same
continuum as explicitly legal institutions.
Toward the informal pole, the problem solving process predominates. Parties to problems or disputes work them out with
such help as they seek. No rules or procedures structure the
fluid give-and-take of the situation, and no rules or formal
14Mass media action lines indeed define themselves in terms of informality and
problem solving. One newspaper serving most of Illinois states: "The Action Line
solves problems, gets answers, cuts red tape, investigates complaints, and stands
up for your rights." Chicago Today, May 23, 1972, at 8.

"sSee,

e.g.,

I R. NADER CONGRESS PROJECT, Report on Ronald V. Dellums, Dem.

Rep. From Cal. 17, in CITIZEN'S LOOK AT CONGRESS (1972); VII id., Report on William
A. Barrett,Dem. Rep. From Pa. 1-2. See also E. O'CONNOR, THE LAST HURRAH 11-16 (1955).
16 See, e.g., FULLER, supra note 10, at 110.
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precedents result from the outcome. The resolution need not
be evaluated normatively as long as the dispute is terminated.
As one moves away from this pole toward the formal pole, the
third-party presence (usually the state) increases, the formal
rules and procedures of law play a greater role, and the process
of applying, deciding, and announcing fixed rules increases in
importance relative to the problem solving process. As one
moves further in the direction of the formal pole of the continuum, the flexibility and particularity of concentrating on
concrete disputes and their resolution gives way to the application of fixed norms to disputes.
The ideal of the common law process occupies a self-conscious midpoint on the continuum, attempting at once to emphasize concrete dispute resolution and rulemaking decisions
that create precedents. The common law's resolution of concrete disputes often involves the application of existing general rules that do not seem completely appropriate to the individual dispute; on the other hand, common law precedents often
seem to be a patchwork of statements of rules designed to settle
particular atypical disputes and thus seem not to form a coherent set of abstract rules to channel behavior. The tension
generated by hewing to this middle course illustrates the divergent dispute management processes I have described as a
continuum.
As one moves past the model of the common law courts
toward the formal pole, the concrete problem-solving function
begins to drop out entirely, to be replaced by the processes of
fashioning and communicating general rules. The approach
to the task of dispute management shifts from the amelioration
of present disputes to the prevention of future disputes.
One further feature of the continuum is important to the
consideration of the management of consumer disputes. Increased formality carries with it increased resource requirements. Informal dispute resolution involves only the immediate
dispute. Only as much time and other resources as are required
to resolve that problem need be expended on the particular dispute. More formal problem resolution involves other disputes
as well (those which will be resolved or prevented by the precedent established by the outcome of this dispute) and hence
demands more resources to fashion appropriate general rules.
A direct negotiation with a store or a call to a friend who works
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FIGURE I

THE SYSTEM oF DISPUTE MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS
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at the store to request help with a dispute usually involves little
time, little energy, and no fees, additional manpower, or other
specialized resources. The use of a neighborhood pro se small
claims court or arbitration board (where such things are available) requires more resources-preparation of some papers, organization of receipts and arguments, attendance at a hearing,
and the strain of stating and arguing the case. In addition,judges
and places to hold the proceedings are required. Common law
courts and administrative tribunals require still more resources
from the litigants and from the dispute resolution institution.
Litigants require lawyers, complex documents, witnesses, and
filing fees. The investment of time spent in hearings and preparation of cases increases. Hearing rooms must be larger to accommodate the public, additional court personnel, parties, lawyers,
and witnesses (hence specialized courthouses and hearing rooms
emerge). The adjudicators must often issue written opinions,
requiring further time and resources for specialized professional judges, law clerks, clerical help, and the publication and
retrieval of opinions. The mobilization of legislative solutions
to problems requires even more resources-gaining the support
of segments of societal power, lobbying, committee hearings,
staff reports, the time and salaries of whole legislatures and
their staffs. Such increasing resources are congruent with the
broadening focus and impact of the more formal processes
and their products.
The heavy investment of resources required to use formal
institutions to resolve disputes creates a pressure to resolve
them by more informal means; the continuum therefore defines the typical sequence of resources used in the course of
attempting to resolve a dispute. One may appeal the unsuccessful outcome of direct negotiations to one community resource,
then to another, and finally to a court. Or one may not appeal,
but simply "lump it" when the required resource investment
becomes too large relative to the subjective importance of the
dispute. In this manner, the eclectic assortment of institutions
and resources that are actually used in the course of trying to
solve a problem or settle a dispute are interrelated to form a
loosely organized system of dispute settlement resources which
may be seen as a part of the more encompassing system of dispute management institutions.
Informal institutions require fewer resources to handle a
single dispute since they dispense with the rulemaking func-
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tion; but informal institutions are more efficient to the society
as a whole (fewer resources may resolve the same number of
disputes) as well as to the party with the problem.' 7 More formal
institutions address behavior on a macro-level by stating general
rules which, to the extent they are followed, may prevent numerous disputes; yet they provide little concrete micro-problem-solving capacity to handle active disputes.
As the case study of a consumer fraud bureau is discussed,
it will become apparent that the bureau operates at several different levels of the continuum. What I have referred to as the
law enforcement stance of the bureau describes its functions in
the more formal portion of the continuum. The bureau is a
part of the formal machinery of government-a division of the
state attorney general's office-and has formal law enforcement
authority. Yet as it functions as a community resource to help
consumers who complain to it and to resolve their disputes, the
bureau acts informally, largely without stated rules or powers,
and independently of its statutory law enforcement powers.
Thus the bureau also functions in the more informal portion
of the continuum, nearer the problem-solving pole.
II.

THE CONSUMER FRAUD BUREAU

This Article is based upon the detailed examination of one
consumer fraud bureau of the Illinois Attorney General's Division of Consumer Fraud and Protection. The office (hereinafter called "the Bureau")' 8 examined in detail is located in
the downtown business area of a major city in Illinois and serves
the metropolitan area of that city.
Consumer fraud bureaus are generally divisions of state attorneys general's offices. They exist in many states and have
"7Efficiency in resource use is often accompanied by what may be seen as
arbitrariness and dispute outcomes which do not conform to legal rules (justice).
Informal institutions are characteristically controlled by party bargaining rather
than by objective decision, and disputes, therefore, terminate when both parties,
grievances are reduced below the threshold level at which they will take action on
them, whether or not the facts have been ascertained or the outcome arranged
in accordance with legal norms. Informal outcomes may be arbitrary with respect
to the applicable legal rules and inconsistent with each other-achievement of
these goals would require additional resource use. Consistency and rule conformity
are more characteristic of the less resource-efficient, more formal dispute settlement instittitions.
11One of the conditions for gaining access to Bureau files and hearings, which
are not generally accessible to the public, was that the location of the specific office
of the Consumer Fratid and Protection Division examined in detail not be stated.
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powers roughly comparable to the one studied in depth. 19 They
are created as law enforcement agencies and are granted investigatory and prosecutorial powers to prevent certain proscribed business practices. The title of the empowering statute
of the bureau which we studied sets as its purpose "to protect
consumers and borrowers against fraud and certain other practices by or on behalf of sellers and lenders of money and to give
the Attorney General certain powers and duties for the enforcement thereof."20 The main operative provision of this Consumer
Fraud Act declares:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely
upon such concealment, suppression, or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been
misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be
an unlawful practice ....21
The Act goes on to declare certain other more specific acts to
be unlawful practices2 2 and grants the following broad enforcement powers:
Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that a
person has engaged in, is engaging in or is about to
" See NAAG REPORT, supra note 2, at 420;

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS

17-29 (Aug. 1972); Eovaldi
& Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 281,
299-302 (1971); Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer
Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REV. 559, 583-93 (1968); Developments in the Law
-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1124-34 (1967); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programsfor Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
395, 430-34 (1966).
The particular bureau studied is one of the best financed and staffed in the
GENERAL,

STATE PROGRAMS

FOR CONSUMER

PROTECTION

See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, APPROPRIATIONS
AND COMPENSATION table 3.54B (Feb. 1972); NAAG REPORT, supra note 2, at 417-18;
country.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION 11-13 (Dec. 1973); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,

STATE PROGRAMS FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION 17-18 (Aug. 1972). It is also one of
the few bureaus that claims to handle all complaints received. Id. 41.
20Act of July 26, 1967, § 2, [1967] Ill.
Laws 2143 (now ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 121 ,
§ 261 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974)). The Consumer Fraud Act was substantially amended
effective October 1, 1973, and became the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices
Act (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 261-72 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974)). The Consumer
Fraud Act is quoted here as it was in force during 1972, the year for which Bureau
activity is examined.
21Act of July 24, 1961, § 2, [1961] Ill.
Laws 1867 (now ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 ,

§ 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974)).
22See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 121

, §§ 262A-M (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).

19751

CONSUMER COMPLAINTS

1119

engage in any practice declared to be unlawful by this
Act he may seek and obtain in an action in a Circuit
Court an injunction prohibiting that person from continuing those practices or engaging therein or doing
any acts in furtherance thereof ....
The court may make such orders or judgments as may
be necessary to prevent the use or employment by a
person of any prohibited practices, or which may be
necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys
or property, real or personal, which may have been
acquired by means of any practice in this Act declared
to be unlawful including the appointment of a receiver
or the revocation of a license or certificate of registration authorizing that person to engage in business in
this State or both23in cases of substantial and wilful violation of this Act.
Although such bureaus are legislatively defined as law enforcement agencies, they often in fact have adopted a dispute
settlement stance of informally helping consumers to solve their
problems with sellers that has all but supplanted their formal
law enforcement activities. What may have started as a process
of investigation of complaints and other information to determine whether cases warrant prosecution has evolved into something quite different-the mass processing of individual consumer-seller disputes. The function of dispute resolution has
taken on a life of its own quite independent of the law enforcement function. The law enforcement activities of the bureaus
are related only tenuously to the dispute settling process. The
National Association of Attorneys General says of the choice
between prosecution and complaint handling:
Once the legislative framework for consumer protection has been established, questions of administrative policy remain. States differ in the relative emphasis
they give to handling individual complaints or to preventing deceptive practices. Some states stress records
of recoveries ....
Other administrators contend that a good consumer fraud program must involve both restitution
to individual complaints and the prosecution of of24
fenders.
23 Act of Sept. 6, 1968, § 1; [1968] I11. Laws 410 (now
§ 267 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974)).
24 NAAG REPORT, supra note 2, at 411.
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This ought not to be thought of as a simple question of "administrative policy" to be decided on the basis of prevailing
notions of what would be a "good consumer fraud program."
Rather, complaint handling and prosecution are separate modes
of response to consumer complaints which arise out of divergent ways of perceiving and defining consumer problems. The
dispute settlement and law enforcement stances are fundamentally incompatible in assuming divergent definitions of
consumer grievances and in leading to different types of reaction.
Data were collected from several sources in order to determine how the Bureau approaches and carries out its functions.
First, complaints received by the Bureau and their disposition were analyzed. A systematic sample, every twentieth case
of the total of 9015 Bureau complaints, was selected for analysis.
The resulting sample of 449 files was drawn from complaint
files closed by the downtown office in 1972.
The sample complaint files were coded by two coders and
the data were prepared for and analyzed by a 370 IBM computer. 25 In addition to the sample of complaint files, we examined
all litigation files which involved any complaint file in the sample,
thirty-four in all. Litigation files typically involve multiple complaints against a single business. The inclusion of one of the
complaint files in the sample in a litigation file selected the entire litigation file for study. The sample of litigation files appears
fairly representative when compared to the Bureau's overall
litigation docket records.
Second, in order to determine the reliability of our inferences from the complaint files, to determine the impact of Bureau action on the disputes, and to gain some further understanding of the underlying disputes, we interviewed a sample
of complainants on whose complaints the Bureau had acted.
The validity of much of the information collected from the
files was verified by means of selected interviews with complainants. In most cases the interviews confirmed the file information and our interpretation of the facts of the complaint and
the attitudes and actions of the parties. With respect to use of
prior resources, communication and bargaining between the
parties before complaint to the Bureau, the complainant's de25 The intercoder reliability was evaluated on the basis of a subsample of 20
files coded by each coder and the author. The overall agreement on the coding of

these 20 files among the three (two coders and the author) was 85%.
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sire for a public-oriented (punitive) remedy, and his perception
of the seller as dishonest or fraudulent, the interviews supported our inference that the omission of any mention of these
facts in the complaint usually indicated that they had not in
fact occurred.
Although we were initially granted permission to interview
"anyone we wanted to" among the complainants and businessmen, this permission was drastically limited as the time to conduct the interviews approached. Permission to interview businessmen was withdrawn, and the Bureau insisted that it telephone
complainants itself to obtain their consent to be interviewed
before we contacted them. Because of this constraint, the number of interviews had to be severely reduced. Since we were
interested primarily in understanding the impact of Bureau
action on disputes, only complainants in whose cases the Bureau
had successfully contacted the business complained against
were selected. We also limited our interviews to complainants
residing in the metropolitan area. The low proportion (35%)
of complainants contacted within the limited sample selected
for interviews resulted from the Bureau's lack of persistence
in contacting complainants for our interviews. (The task was
assigned to one already busy Bureau secretary.) Although the
proportion of complainants contacted was unfortunately low,
I am reasonably sure that there was no systematic bias in terms
of the substance of the matter or the identities of the parties
involved.
Ultimately, interviews were obtained with a total of 42 complainants (32%), out of a total of 131 complainants with whom
contact was attempted. Six complainants (5%) declined to be
interviewed, three explicitly, three by repeated delay or evasion. The balance of the complainants could not be contacted,
either because no current telephone number could be obtained
(19%) or because no answer could be obtained to telephone calls
(44%). Our conclusions from the interview data are thus impressionistic and not quantitatively conclusive.
Third, I observed 40 informal Bureau hearings on individual
complaints. These hearings concerned current cases, not cases
included in the complaint sample-all of which were closed.
Such hearings normally are closed to the public, with only a
Bureau hearing officer, the complainant, and the representative of the business (and occasionally its lawyer) present. At
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those hearings which I attended I was introduced as "a lawyer,"
or "an observer," or, in many cases, not introduced at all. Because none of the parties had been to a Bureau hearing before,
each was unaware that the presence of an observer was out of
the ordinary. I doubt that my presence at the hearings significantly altered party behavior. I am less sure about its effect on
the conduct of the hearing officers; I was present with the express approval of the chief of the Bureau and my affiliation
with an outside research organization was known. My reasons
for thinking that the hearings I observed were fairly typical
are based on the similarities among what I observed at different hearings, the written reports of prior hearings in the files,
and the impressions of complainants given during interviews
as to the conduct of the hearings and their outcomes.
Fourth, during the course of several months, I had interviews and discussions at various levels of formality with substantially all of the staff of the Bureau. In addition, I had a
chance to observe fairly unobtrusively the intake process, initial
interviews with complainants, and staff discussions of cases,
and generally to get the "feel" of the Bureau and its staff. During this time, I had many discussions with complainants, businessmen, and lawyers present for hearings or to file complaints.
This informal information forms the background of the case
study and of the analysis of the statistical data.
III. THE COMPLAINTS TO THE BUREAU
When consumers feel unfairly treated by retail businesses,
they often complain to and seek help from community resources. 26 As Caplovitz 27 and Levine and Preston 28 have demonstrated, knowledge of available community resources is limited,
and actual use of resources is even more severely limited within
groups known to have many consumer problems; but for those
consumers who have the knowledge, the perseverance, and
the presence of mind, 2 9 there are many community resources
26The words "business" and "seller" as used in this Article include providers

of services as well as of goods. Unless otherwise indicated, I do not mean to distinguish between goods and services.
2' D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967).
28 Levine

& Preston,

19702 Wis. L. REV. 80.

Community Resource Orientation Among Low Income Groups,

1 See J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR 61-76
(1967) (speaking of "legal competence" as the defining and defending of one's legal
rights); Friedman, The Idea o Right as a Social and Legal Concept, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES
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which intervene and provide varying amounts of help. In this
section, I shall analyze those consumers who came to the consumer fraud bureau for help-who they were, what they complained about, what they wanted, and what they did before
coming to the Bureau. In many cases the Bureau intervened;
the process and outcome of Bureau intervention will be discussed in Section IV.
A. Who Complained
Although consumer fraud primarily affects the poor minorities,3 0 it is mostly the white middle class who complain to the
Bureau. The poverty level for a family of four in 1969 in the
standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) in which the Bureau operates was $3,743.31 Seven percent of families in the
SMSA were below the poverty line. In our sample of complainants, only one percent had incomes below $4,000 (an income
level somewhat above the poverty line). Thirty-one percent of
the SMSA population had incomes of more than $15,000, while
in the sample only 15% did. Thus, both extremes of income
level are underrepresented among Bureau complainants. The
proportion of families with median incomes between $10,000
and $15,000 in the SMSA was 32%, whereas in the sample it
was 62%.
The relative absence of both extremes of wealth from Bureau
complainants is striking. One might speculate that the absence
189, 190-92 (1971) (speaking of the concept of "rights consciousness"). These are
among the intangible elements of personality which condition the use of resources
in problem solving.
3' See,' e.g., D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 27; THE LAW AND THE Low INCOME CONSUMER (S. Katz ed. 1968); W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKET
PLACE 32-58 (1968); cf. S. MARGOLIS, THE INNOCENT CONSUMER V. THE EXPLOITERS
(1967); see also Hearings on National Consumer Protection Before the FTC (1968); Joint
Hearings on S. 707 & S. 1160 Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization, Research & International Organizations of the Sen. Comm. on Gov't Ops., and the Subcomm. on Consumers
of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
31 Poverty level data from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION
& HOUSING, CENSUS TRACTS [City], Ill., Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area,
pt. 2, App. B, p. App. 8 (1972). For complainants in the sample our method of approximating complainant income was to locate the census tract in which the complainant
resided and then determine the median family income for that tract. The small
size and homogeneity of census tracts indicates that the approximation is relatively
good. Still the approximation does not take account of the fact that incomes within
the same tract vary from the median income of the tract, or that it is the income
of families that is being used and no adjustment is made as to size of family of the
complainant (a fact we do not know). Information is based on the 1970 Census,
which used 1969 income data.
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FIGURE II
INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF BUREAU COMPLAINANTS AND OF

SMSA

POPULATION
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of poor complainants results from their lack of knowledge of or
confidence in problem-solving resources available in the community. It also might be explained in terms of a reluctance to
assert grievances resulting from habits of subservience and
passivity or from low expectations of success in dealing with
government officials. The consequence of these factors may
frequently be a passive acceptance of one's problems as the
effect of fate, misfortune, or oppression, rather than a more
self-confident conceptualization of problems as individual grievances which can be dealt with. Thus, the poor, one might specu3' 3
late, are short on what has been termed "legal competence.
The absence of the higher income individuals from Bureau complainants may result from very different causes. Higher income
persons are thought to have more of that congeries of characteristics and habits called "legal competence," including more
knowledge of resources, experience and skill in using them,
32 N=334. This is 92% of the 367 who resided in the SMSA. Due to the methodology employed, note 31 supra, income could be approximated only when the
census tract in which the complainant resided could be identified. This could be
done in only 336 cases. Income data were unavailable for two identified census tracts.
Total SMSA data are from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 31, pt. I at P-355.
33
See J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, supra note 29, at 81.
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money to hire them, and more contacts and friendships-more
influence-with which problems can be solved without the use
of organized resources. In addition to this relative abundance
of means to solve problems, the patterns of purchasing are quite
different among the wealthier. The "better" stores which charge
the full undiscounted price may be, in effect, selling problemsolving services with the merchandise so that their higher income customers do not often have to go elsewhere to take care
of problems.
As Table I indicates, the Bureau's complainants were predominantly white. The white complainants had significantly
higher incomes than the black complainants. Although 64% of
black complainants had incomes under $8,000, only 2% of whites
did. Conversely, 26% of white complainants had incomes over
34
$15,000, while no blacks did.

TABLE I
RA E OF BUREAu COMPLAiNANTS AND POPULATiON OF SMSA"

Race

White
Black

Percentage of
Bureau Complaints

88
12
100% (N = 285)

Percentage of
Total SMSA

82
18
100%

Fifty-nine percent of the complainants were men. Although
64% of the white complainants were men, only 43% of the black
complainants were men.
It might be suggested that the lower frequency of complaints
from women, blacks, and lower income people results in part
from the increased difficulty for these groups of physical access
'4 Income level information is based on median family income for an entire
census tract, see note 31 supra. This may distort the analysis of income by race: for
example, it may be the case that there are blacks with incomes of over $15,000 in
the sample but that they were not coded as black because they live in integrated
census tracts. See note 35 infra.
35 Race was determined on the basis of the aggregate racial characteristics of the
census tract in which the complainant resided. Complainants residing in tracts which
were 4% or less black were coded as white (252), those in tracts with 95% or more
black were coded black (33), those residing in tracts of neither description were
coded as unknown (51). The racial breakdown of complainants is based on 336 complainants; census tracts for other complainants could not be identified, see note 32
supra. Total SMSA data are from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 31, pt. I at P-1.
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to the downtown Bureau office. This does not appear to be the
case, however. We know that 45% of the complaints were filed
on Bureau forms and the other 55% by letters. Although we do
not know what proportion of the complaints made on forms
were made in person at the Bureau's office (some were made
on forms mailed to complainants), we do know that those complaining by letter did not complain in person and thus were not
deterred by the trip downtown. A higher proportion of women,
whites, and higher income individuals complained by letter
than of men, blacks, and lower income individuals. Whether
others were deterred we do not know. It ought also to be pointed
out that the act of filing a complaint remotely and impersonally
by letter may itself be an aspect of "legal competence" and sophistication in dealing with bureaucratic organizations that might
explain the higher proportion of letter complaints among the
whites and higher income groups.
The "party in interest" in the complaint was normally an individual or family. Ninety-six percent of the complaints concerned a transaction by an individual or household; only 3%
involved businesses as complainants. The remaining 1% (only
two complaints in our sample) were from other types of entities,
one from a church group, the other from an employee complaining about the business practices of his employer. The relative absence of business complainants may indicate the existence
of other problem-solving techniques and resources available to
businesses. This clearly would be the case when the aggrieved
business is a large customer of the seller.
Complainants generally present their own cases to the Bureau. In 92% of the complaints in the sample, it was the person
with the problem who made the complaint to the Bureau, in
4% a relative (usually for a minor child or an elderly parent),
in 2% a lawyer for-a client, and in 1%, a consumer agency in
another jurisdiction. In one case, an employee wrote for his
employer who did not speak English; in another a minister
wrote for his parishioner. Thus, the Bureau is primarily a pro
se institution. That no specialized spokesmen are required and
that the Bureau accepts informal letters illustrate the low "cost"
to complainants of using the Bureau. This is consistent with
the suggestion that informal problem-solving institutions re36
quire relatively low resource use.
11

See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
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Who Was ComplainedAbout

Small and moderate-sized businesses generated a disproportionate number of complaints relative to the volume of their
business. Figure III compares the proportion of Bureau complaints which were made against businesses of different sizes
with the sales volume of businesses of the same sizes for the
United States as a whole. This comparison yields a rough nodon of the size of businesses whose sales are complained about
most often and, inferentially, whose sales most often generate
grievances.
The largest businesses either generated fewer problems, or
more often settled them through bargaining, or else the complaints were taken elsewhere than to the Bureau. Similarly,
the larger businesses more often resolved complaints presented
to them by the Bureau.
FIGURE III
DISTRIBUTION OF BUREAU COMPLAINTS INVOLVING BUSINESSES OF DIFFERENT
SIZES COMPARED WITH DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL SALES
VOLUME BY BUSINESSES OF DIFFERENT SIZES

37

/-%
of total national sales volume by businesses of each size

LII -o

of Bureau complaints involving businesses of each size
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2.
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(net assets in $1,000's)

'T Sales volume from U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME-1970, BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURNS (1973). Net assets from
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C. What Was ComplainedAbout-The
Underlying Transaction
The complaints in the sample arose out of a tremendous
variety of types of transactions. Table II compares the categories of consumer transactions generating complaints to the
TABLE II
COMPAISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF BUREAU COMPLAINTS WITH DISTRIBUTION

OF

NATIONAL CONSUMER EXPENDITURES FOR TYPES OF COODS AND SERVICES"

Proportion of
Bureau
Complaints

Type of Goods
or Services

(To Nearest Percent)
Proportion of
Proportion of
Bureau Complaints
U.S. Personal
Weighted by Size
Expenditures

Housing

22%

40%

15%

Transportation
Household (includes furniture, equipment, housewares, appliances, radio, television, etc.)
Personal Business (includes banks,
insurance and credit companies, investment advisors, franchisors, employment agencies, etc.)

22

34

13

15

5

14

11

13

6

Recreation and Travel

7

2

6

Clothing, Jewelry, Accessories

4

3

10

Food, Beverages, Tobacco, and Personal Care

3

2

25

Medical Care

1

0

8

Other (includes schools and selfimprovement, books, magazines,
etc.)

15

3

100% (N = 449)

DUN

&

BRADSTREET,

MIDDLE MARKET

DIRECTORY

(1972),

4

102% (N

and

DUN

- 438)

&

101%

BRADSTREET,

MILLION DOLLAR DIRECTORY (1972), and, for the categories tinder 25, 25-99, and
100-499, subjective judgments based on the contents of the Bureau files, including
descriptions by complainants and Bureau personnel, number of branches, number
of employees, pictures of business establishments, etc.
"I Percentages for U.S. Personal Expenditures are from the 1970 column, rounded
off, of Personal Consumption Expenditures, by Product 1950-70 in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
1972 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 315. "Proportion of Bureau Complaints"
refers to the proportion of the number of Bureau complaints in the sample involving each type of goods or services. "Proportion of Bureat Complaints Weighted by
Size" refers to the proportion of the number of Bureau complaints in the sample involving each type of goods or services adjusted for the dollar amount of the transaction that generated the complaint. The adjustment was made by multiplying each
complaint by the approximate dollar amount of the transaction underlying it and
then recalculating the proportions of complaints involving each type of goods or services, with the resulting weighted complaint totals for each category. Complaints
in which the dollar amount of the underlying transaction could not be determined
are omitted.
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Bureau with expenditures for personal consumption, showing
which areas of the retail consumer marketplace generate the
most complaints relative to the volume of business. The first
column of Table II shows the distribution of Bureau complaints
in the sample arising out of transactions involving various types
of goods and services. The second column shows the distribution of Bureau complaints arising out of transactions involving various types of goods and services weighted by the dollar
amount of the underlying transactions. Column 3 shows the
distribution of national consumer expenditures among the
various types of goods and services. One can infer from comparing columns 2 and 3 in Table II that the disproportionately
troublesome areas of the consumer economy are automobiles,
housing (home construction and improvement, and central
heating and air conditioning), and personal business. That
housing is a troublesome area is understated, because national
housing expenditure as shown in Table II includes all rents
paid and the rental value of owner-occupied houses, as well
as construction, improvement, and central systems. Complaints
about schools and self-improvement courses made up almost
half of the "other" category and seem disproportionately high.
Complaints appear to arise disproportionately from consumer
purchases where complex machinery or skilled labor is involved,
and, as would be expected, less often where the typical item of
purchase is very small, such as food.
The size of the transactions giving rise to complaints is interesting principally for its variation. As Table III shows, 30%
TABLE III
AIOUNT OF TRANSACTION

GIVING RISE TO BUREAU

COMPLAINT"'

Under $10 .................................................
8%
$10-$49 ...................................................
13
$50-$99 .....................................................
9
$100-$499 ................................................
26
$500-$999 ................................................
16
$1,000-$4,999 ......................................... 22
$5,000-$9,999 ............................................
3
$10,000 & over ........................................
3
100% (N = 395)

a. Cases where the amount could not be determined (43) and where no trans-

action was involved (11) are omitted.
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of the transactions involved total amounts of less than $100,
and 6% involved amounts in excess of $5,000. In smaller transactions, complainants tended to see the whole amount of the
transaction as in dispute. In larger transactions, they defined
the amount in dispute as a much smaller figure relative to the
amount of the transaction.
The origin of the transaction-the situation in which the
transaction was originally carried out-is crucial in characterizing the transactions giving rise to the disputes. The majority
(82%) of transactions involved purchases initiated by the buyer
and made on a face-to-face basis, normally in the seller's store.
In only 18% of these transactions was the seller's advertising
mentioned by the complainant. One can infer that advertising
was not a central factor in the balance (64%) of the in-store transactions. Six percent of the complaints involved door-to-door sales,
and 8% involved mail order sales. (Five percent could not be
determined.)
This distribution is curious because consumer fraud has
been reputed to involve door-to-door solicitation, deceptive
advertising, or other seller-initiated contact and often to involve enticing misrepresentations, high pressure tactics, and getrich-quick schemes. This stereotypical consumer fraud involves
a seller without an established place of business. But the complaints to the Bureau arise less out of such fraud situations than
out of buyer-initiated purchases from a stable seller with a known
place of business. The lack of congruence between the complaints received by the. Bureau and the stereotypes of consumer
fraud begins to raise the question whether the complaints are
properly thought of in terms of fraud. We have already discussed the widespread ambivalence in defining concrete transactions in terms of seller's deviant conduct (the law enforcement
stance), or contractual breach, or even misunderstanding (the
dispute settlement stance). This ambivalence in defining the
situation will be observed again when the stance adopted by
the Bureaa in responding to consumer complaints is examined.
D. The Grievance
Almost all of the complaints concerned specific consumer
purchases with which the buyer-complainant was dissatisfied.
Each complaint was about an active current dispute between
the complainant and a specific seller over a specific purchase
transaction. The complaints were not generally about chronic
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conditions or general practices, such as high prices, poor quality or safety, sales practices, unavailability of goods, or credit
or collection practices. Table IV shows the distribution of grievances stated by the complaints.
The largest group of complaints-30%---concerned dissatisfaction with the service or product itself rather than with
the practices of the seller. This group complained about specific
defects in the products or services. An additional 18% concerned
the failure of the seller to complete the transaction or to satisfactorily repair defective goods when he had agreed to do so.
Thirteen percent were cases where the seller had done nothing
at all to carry out the transaction. Thus, 61% of the complaints
involved disputes about the substance of the transaction-the
products and services themselves-and not deceptive sales practices, false promises, or price, credit, or other terms of sale.
TABEI

IV

PRIARY GIEVANCE STATED BY COMPLAINTS

D efective product ...................................................................
Incomplete performance ..........................................................
Misrepresentation, deception, undue influence ......................
Price or credit ..........................................................................
N o perform ance .......................................................................
O ther ...........................................................................................

30%
18
18
15
13
6
100%
(N = 449)

In 33% of the complaints the grievance involved conditions
or practices of the seller rather than the product itself-in 15%
the focus was on the price or terms of credit, and in 18% the
primary complaint concerned misrepresentation, deception,
or undue influence by the seller. Only when misrepresentation,
deception, or undue influence was the sole primary grievance
was the complaint included in that category in Table IV. Complaints giving primary emphasis both to misrepresentation,
deception, or undue influence and to another grievance are
shown in Table IV as stating the grievance other than misrepresentation. In 9% of the complaints both misrepresentation,
deception, or undue influence and another grievance were
stated. Thus, a total of 27% alleged misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence.
The complaints were coded as alleging misrepresentation,
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deception, or undue influence if the complainant's perception of
the seller's conduct in such terms could be judged from the complaint. The coding criterion was the complainant's subjective
perception of his situation. Although the coding involved subjective judgments on the part of the coders, they attempted to
code the complainant's perception of the seller's conduct and
not their own. One complaint, for example, stated that the complainant had seen a newspaper advertisement for driveway
blacktopping. The ad described the product in glowing terms
as "weather resistant, guaranteed not to crack for at least three
years." Within months after complainant's driveway was paved,
it began to crack. The complainant demanded that the paving
company return and repave the driveway with better quality
materials. The company refused, saying that the ground was
muddy and that paving sometimes cracks under such circumstance. The complainant's letter to the Bureau condemned
the seller for using poor material and doing shoddy work, but
did not refer to the assurances in the advertisement; therefore,
the complaint was coded as not alleging misrepresentation.
Other complainants in similar situations complained of the
dishonesty of the company in repeatedly assuring them how
long the paving would last. The transactions may have been
objectively similar, but the buyers perceived, or at least articulated, the problem quite differently. Similarly, in high pressure
door-to-door sales cases, some complainants objected to the high
pressure tactics and false promises, while others said that they
did not have much money and could not afford to pay so much
for a product or service of such low quality.
Table V shows the proportion of various types of transactions
underlying Bureau complaints where the buyer alleged misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence. For each type
of underlying transaction, column 1 shows the proportion of
the dollar value of Bureau complaints of the type alleging misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence; column 2 shows the
proportion of the number of Bureau complaints (not weighted
for the dollar value of each transaction) so alleging; and column
3 shows the proportion of the total number of Bureau complaints involving the type of transaction. For the whole sample
(complaints of all types), 28% of the dollar value of complaints
and 27% of the number of complaints involved such allegations.
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TxnrLE V
PROPORTION OF BUREAU

Type of Goods
or Services

COMPLAINTS

0

ALLEGING MISREPRESENTATION"

Proportion of
Bureau Complaints
Alleging Misrepresentation Weighted
by Size (to
nearest %)

Proportion of
Bureau Complaints
Alleging Misrepreseutation (Unweighted) (to
nearest %)

100%

100%

95
93
60
43
41
41

33
55
41
17
31
19

3
4
7
1
22
6

33
25
24

29
38
20

7
8
5

18

30

10

10

5

13

9
4
0
0
0

27
38
5
0
0

2
4
4
2
1

Medical Care
Food, Beverages, Tobacco
and Personal Care
Books, Magazines, and Records
Real Estate
Travel
Automobiles
Recreation
Personal Business and Financial
Planning
Schools and Self-Improvement
TV, Radio, and Stereo
Household Furniture and
Appliances
Home Construction and
Improvement
Air Conditioning and Heating
Systems
Investment and Franchises
Clothing, Jewely, and Furs
Banks and Insurance
Other
TOTAL (all types of goods
and services)

28%

27%

Proportion
of Bureau
Complaints

1%

100%
(N = 449)

This ranged from medical care complaints, all of which alleged
misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence, to complaints
involving clothing, jewelry, and furs, banks and insurance, and
41
other transactions, where no such allegations were made.
40 Weighting of Bureau complaints is as explained in note 38 supra.
Table V-A sets out the comparison of the distribution of Bureau complaints
alleging misrepresentation, deceit, and undue influence with the distribution of national consumer expenditures for various types of goods and services. This com41

parison is set out in a separate table because the national expenditure data could
not be obtained in sufficient detail to allow use of the breakdown of types of goods
and services in Table V. Table V-A uses the less detailed categories of types of goods
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The demography of the complainant and size of the dispute
were related to whether the complainant explicitly alleged misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence. Such allegations also were significantly associated with the race and sex
and services used in Table II. Column 1 of Table V-A shows the proportion of dollar
value of Bureau complaints alleging misrepresentation, deceit, or undue influence
involving each type of goods and services. Column 1 refers only to complaints in the
sample which make such allegations (N=117). Column 2 of Table V-A shows the
proportion of dollar value of all Bureau complaints involving each type of goods
and, services (this is the same data as shown in column 2 of Table II). Column 3 of Table
V-A shows the proportion of national consumer expenditures for each type of goods
and services (this is the same data as shown in column 3 of Table II). A comparison
of columns I and 3 of Table V-A shows the comparison of complaints alleging misrepresentation, deceit, or undue influence with total national consfImer expenditures,
both measured by dollar value of transactions by type of goods and services.

TABLE V-A
COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF BUREAU COMPLAINTS ALLEGING MISREPRESENTATION
WiTH DISTRIUTION OF CONSUMER EXPENDITURES FOR TYPES OF GOODS AND SERVICES

Types of Goods
or Services

(To nearest %)
Proportion of Bureau
Complaints Alleging Proportion of All
Bureau Complaints
Misrepresentation
Weighted by Size Weighted by Size

Housing
Transportation
Personal Business (includes banks,
insurance and credit companies, investment advisors, franchisors, employment agencies, etc.)
Food, Beverages, Tobacco, and Personal Care
Household (includes furniture, equipment, housewares, appliances, radio, television, etc.)
Recreation and Travel
Medical Care
Clothing, Jewelry, Accessories
Other (includes schools and self-improvement, books, magazines, etc.)

38%
37

40%
34

Proportion of
U.S. Consumer
Expenditures

15%
13

9

13

6

5

2

25

3
2
0
0

5
2
0
3

14
6
8
10

4
98%
(N = 117)

3
102%
(N = 438)

4
101%

Percentages for U.S. Personal Expenditures are from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra
note 38. Bureau complaints weighted as explained in note 38 supra.
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of complainants. Both white 4 2 and male 43 complainants made
such allegations more often than black or female complainants.
Higher income complainants also seem to have alleged misrepre-

sentation, deception, or undue influence more often, although
the association was not statistically significant. 4 4 Whether these
42

RACE AND ALLEGATION OF MISREPRESENTATION,
OR UNDUE

DECEPTION

INFLUENCE

Complainant Race

Alleged misrepresentation, etc.
Did not allege misrepresentation, etc.

White

Black

31%
69

9%
91

100%

100%

(N = 252)

(N = 33)

Chi square test is significant at the .01 level; complaints where race could not be
determined are omitted, iee note 35 supra.
SEX AND ALLEGATION OF MISREPRESENTATION,
OR UNDUE

DECEPTION

INFLUENCE

Complainant Sex

Alleged misrepresentation, etc.
Did not allege misrepresentation, etc.

Male

Female

30%
70

21%
79

100%
(N = 260)

100%
(N = 180)

Chi square test is significant at the .05 level; complaints where sex could not be determined are omitted.
'4

INCOME LEVEL AND ALLEGATION OF MISREPRESENTATION, DECEPTION
OR UNDUE INFLUENCE

Complainant Income

Alleged misrepresentation, etc.
Did not allege misrepresentation, etc.

$0-

$8,000-

$10,000-

S12,000-

$14,000-

Over

7,999

9,999

11,999

13,999

16,999

$17,000

11%

20%

25%

35%

34%

32%

89
100%
(N = 36)

80
100%
(N = 35)

75
100%
(N=97)

65
100%
(N=91)

66
100%
(N=44)

68
100%
(N=31)

Chi square test is significant at the .07 level, not within the .05 level at which findings are conventionally accepted; complaints where income could not be determined
are omitted, see note 32 supra.
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allegations were made was also associated with the stated dollar
amount in dispute-the larger the dispute, the more often mis45
representation, deception, or undue influence was alleged.
This association was most clearly illustrated by the numerous
complaints against car dealers for selling defective cars which
soon needed to be repaired at buyer's expense. Where repairs
were expensive, the dealer was often characterized as dishonest
and as selling cars he knew were falling apart. Where the repairs were less costly, complainants were less apt to make judgments about the dealer's honesty and more apt to say only how
unfair it was that they had to pay anything or to complain that
the car did not run properly.
Although the data are not conclusive, these associations suggest the hypothesis that allegations of misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence relate to the characteristics of complainants and the saliency of the disputes to them rather than
solely to the objective actions of the businesses involved. There
is nothing new in suggesting that different people perceive
the same objective events in different ways. The differing perceptions of crumbling pavement illustrate differences in perceptions of identical events. These associations, however, imply
that such perceptions are associated systematically with demographic and saliency variables.
It might be that these data are reflecting the relationships
suggested by Carlin, Howard, and Messinger 46 concerning
legal competence, adversariness, and assertiveness. According
45

AMOUNT IN DISPUTE AND ALLEGATION OF MISREPRESENTATION,
DECEPTION OR UNDUE INFLUENCE

Alleged misrepresentation, etc.

Did not allege misrepresentation, etc.

$049

$5099

19%

17%

Amount in Dispute
$1005500499
999

27%

30%

Over
$1,000

49%

81
100%

83
100%

73
100%

70
100%

51
100%

(N = 82)

(N = 46)

(N = 92)

(N = 46)

(N = 51)

Chi square test is significant at the .01 level; complaints where dispute size could
not be determined are omitted.
46
J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, supra note 29. See also F. MARKS, THE
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1971); Levine & Preston, supra
note 28.
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to such theories, higher income white males may simply be those
with the most "legal competence," those who more easily identify and aggressively assert their rights, and those who perceive
more fraud and take a more accusatory stance in relation to
their transactions. One might speculate that those with the most
experience in dealing with strangers in business transactions
are the most adept in separating business affairs from the emotional ways of interacting in primary groups such as family
and community, and thus are more able (or more likely) to take
a strong and even accusatory stance in such business relationships. Similarly, the association between the amount in dispute
and the allegation of misrepresentation, deception, or undue
influence suggests that it may be the salience of the dispute for
the complainant, not the conduct of the seller, which shapes the
complainant's perception of the situation.
E.

What the Complainants Wanted

The overwhelming majority of complainants sought redress
of their private grievances. Not surprisingly, they sought the
dispute intervention response of the Bureau. Most complainants were highly emotional and were concerned about crisis
problems in connection with consumer purchases. Most felt
injured and unfairly treated by sellers who failed to complete
transactions, delivered defective goods, or performed services
inadequately; they sought help from the Bureau in dealing with
the present crisis. Typically, the Bureau was asked to take up
individual cases against sellers by "making" them give the buyers
what they were entitled to. Several complainants said they wanted
the Bureau to take the seller to court for them to get their money
back.4 7
47 Several typical complaints read in part as follows:
X came to fix my roof last December. It's March now and my roof still leaks. I
need help getting X to finish the job. Two men came out and worked on the roof
all day. I paid them $300. They left saying they needed some supplies and they'd
return and finish up in a few days. I keep calling but all they say is they will come. They
never do. Here are pictures of my living room showing how the paint is ruined. I
need to have the leak fixed. Please help me get them to finish the job.
I ordered a new car from Y dealer two weeks ago. Now they say that it is ready
to be picked up and that I owe them $3682. That is $150 more than I agreed to pay.
I go to pick it up and they tell me they have rust-proofed the car and it costs $150.
I don't want the car rust-proofed. Now they have my deposit of $250 and they won't
give me the car for what they agreed to sell it to me for.
Z company wrote me a letter telling me how I could earn $100 a week at home
by working for just a few hours if I would simply return the coupon with a check for
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Table VI shows the types of remedies requested in the complaints in the sample. Twenty-three percent wanted the transaction performed or completed. Only 14% wanted the transaction canceled and their money returned. Fifty percent wanted
restitution in the form of partial refund, repair, or replacement. More than half of the complainants, therefore, were seeking to have the transactions completed as originally conceived.
A relatively small proportion wanted the transaction terminated.
TABLE VI
PRIIARY REMEDIES REQUESTED BY COMPLAINANTS

8

Restitution, repair, replacement ...............................................
Completion of performance ....................................................
Cancellation of transaction ................................
Protection of public or punishment of seller only ..................
Information of seller's reputation or buyer's rights ................
O ther ..........................................................................................

50%
23
14
6
5
2
100%

(N = 366)

The complainants generally did not seek compensation for
their time, expense, or inconvenience. Their concept of equity
was typically limited to having the transaction completed, repaired, or terminated. Some commentators have seen the failure
to obtain consequential damages as a serious failing of consumer
fraud bureaus.4 9 It is interesting to note that the complainants
themselves generally do not articulate such demands to the
$25 for the supplies and an -instruction book and to cover postage. Well I just got
the stuff today and all it is is a pile of form letters about ordering encyclopedias and
a letter from them saying I will get $10 for each person I write to that orders one. I
know this isn't worth $25 and that I'll never make a hundred dollars a week no matter
who I write to. They really cheated me. I don't have much money and I can't spare
twenty-five dollars for this junk that is why I want to make some extra money and
answered the letter.
I don't know what to do. I went to W store and picked out a sofa. When they
delivered it it wasn't the same I had picked out. They say that they didn't have any
more of the color I wanted because a salesman didn't know the one I chose was sold
and sold it to someone else. Well I don't want the red sofa that I have because my
husband likes the gold color much better. But he said that if we can't get the color
we wanted then we shouldn't have to pay so much for the sofa which we didn't really
want. We're willing to keep the sofa but not for the full $800. W already assigned the note to the finance company and the sofa we picked out was the last one
they had.
4s Complaints not specifying any remedy (83) are omitted.
4
E.g., P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR THE DECEIVED 187-88 (1972).
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Bureau. Only 14% of the complaints stated the amount in dispute to be in excess of the amount of the transaction, while 71%
stated the amount in dispute as the amount of the transaction
and 15% stated the amount actually paid.
Rarely do complaints to the Bureau concern chronic social
problems in which the complainant has no immediate private
stake. Rather, it is an immediate injury and an active dispute
that motivates complainants. Only 12% in all requested publicoriented remedies-for example, that the seller be punished
or prevented from continuing his fraudulent business practices or that the public be warned or protected. That 12% includes both complainants who sought only public-oriented
remedies (shown in Table VI) and those who sought both private and public-oriented ones.
Most complainants were seeking remedial action by the
seller to complete the transaction; most complaints were framed
as conflicts where the primary issue was who was to bear a perceived loss. The dispute concerned the quality of the goods or
services themselves. Where the issues of misrepresentation,
deception, or undue influence were raised or where a publicoriented remedy was sought, the dispute appears to have shifted
away from the complainant's loss and who was to bear it, toward
the situation's normative definition and whether the seller had
committed an offense.
As with the allegation of misrepresentation, deception, or
undue influence, the request for a public remedy is associated
with demographic factors and with the size of the dispute. White
complainants sought public remedies more often than black
complainants,5" and higher income complainants more often
50

RACE AND REQUEST FOR PUBLIC-ORIENTED REMEDY
Complainant Race

Public remedy requested
No public remedy requested

white

Black

13%
87

0%
100

100%
(N = 205)

100%
(N = 24)

Chi square test is significant at the .13 level, not within the .05 level at which
findings are conventionally accepted; complaints where race could not be determined
(164), see note 35 supra, and where remedy was not specified (77) are omitted.
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than lower income ones. 5 1

One white complainant with an income of over $15,000
had signed up for a series of twenty karate classes on the assurance that he could cancel without any obligation after the
first class and have his $400 fully refunded. After the first class
he tried to cancel but was told that he had a contract for the
course that could not be broken. His complaint concluded, "It
is a crime people like this are allowed to be out of prison cheating everyone. Can't you punish them and make them stop doing this sort of crooked stuff to people."
The association of demographic factors with the demand
for public-oriented remedies again seems consistent with the
notion of legal competence. 52 Some people may simply be more
sensitive to the infringement of their rights, more "rights conscious," 5 3 more prone to perceive the conduct of parties with
whom they are in conflict in normative terms and to demand
that "The Law" be enforced. In other words, one might speculate that the demand for a public remedy is consistent with the
tendency to perceive conflict in terms of issues of principle-the
moral absolutes of one's legal rights-rather than in terms of
the give-and-take of compromising and interpersonal adjustment.
It might be objected that these speculations stray too far
from the data in inferring broad conceptual patterns from what
may be nothing more than evanescent fits of pique, stubbornness, or the desire to "get the bastards." This characterization
of what I have referred to in the complaints as allegations of
fraud and demands for public-oriented remedies is not inconINCOME LEVEL AND

REQUEST FOR PUBLIC-ORIENTED

REMEDY

Complainant Income
$0-

Public remedy requested
No public remedy requested

$12,000-

$14,000-

Over

11,999

13,999

16,999

$17,000

4%
96
100%

11%
89
100%

16%
84
100%

28%
72
100%

(N = 75)

(N = 37)

(N = 25)

(N = 135)

Chi square test is significant at the .001 level; complaints where income could not
be determined (115), see note 32 supra, and where remedy was not specified (77),
are omitted.
52 See J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, supra note 29.
51See Friedman, supra note 29.
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sistent with my admittedly speculative suggestions. The startling
fact that the frequency of having and/or articulating such fits of
indignation (if that is the proper characterization) is correlated
with race and income level indicates that perception of rights,
reaction to conflict situations, and use of legal resources vary
54
profoundly among demographic groups.
Requests for public remedies were more common when the
amount in dispute was small. 55 The negative correlation between dispute size and demand for public remedy seems explicable in terms of the motivations of complainants to complain.
One's motivation to seek a private remedy quite reasonably
varies positively with the amount in dispute-the saliency of the
dispute to him. Where the amount is small, saliency would be
low, and fewer complainants would be motivated to seek only
a private remedy; if they were to complain at all, it would likely
be for public-oriented relief. The most extreme example was
a complaint about a fast-food chain for overcharging on the
state sales tax: "While I have lost only one cent they are cheating the public out of millions of dollars by overcharging everyone this way. This is a gross fraud and must not be allowed to
go on."
Four percent of the complainants in the sample requested
only information. Over half of these (2% of the total sample)
5 S.

RANULF,

MORAL

INDIGNATION

AND

iMIDDLE

CLASS

(1964),

PSYCHOLOGY

presents a historical analysis of the conditions under which a well-developed system
of criminal law appears in society and concludes that "the disinterested tendency to
inflict punishment is a distinctive characteristic of the lower middle class ....
" Id.
198. In the present context one might speak of the tendency to define consumer
disputes in absolute normative terms and to demand public responses, and suggest
that it is a middle class phenomenon.
55

AMOUNT iN DISPUTE AND REQUEST FOR PUBLIC-ORIENTED
Amount in dispute
$100$50-

$0-

S10-

9

49

99

499

23%

16%

10%

4%

REMEDY

$500-

Over

999

81,000

Public remedy
requested
No public remedy
requested

5%

10%

76

84

90

96

95

90

100%
(N = 30)

100%
(N = 45)

100%
(N = 40)

100%
(N = 82)

100%
(N = 39)

100%
(N = 41)

Chi square test is significant at the .05 level; complaints where dispute size could
not be determined (121) and where remedy was not specified (77) are omitted.
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sought advice on their rights in a present disputed transaction,
the remainder (2%) sought information about a business before entering into a transaction with it. Although one of the
main themes of consumer education is that one should seek
information about the seller before buying, the Bureau generally
declined to give such information. None of the complaints in
the sample that sought information was acted upon, though
hearing officers said informal advice was occasionally given
about where the complainant might go for help.
F. What Complainants Did Before
Complaining to the Bureau
Many complaints to the Bureau involve transactions started
long before the complaint. Some transactions, especially those
involving construction or major installations, inherently take
substantial amounts of time to perform. Others may be protracted for such reasons as the need for an appointment to
get into a house or for successive attempts to repair a car. This
section explores what people do to cope with disputes over what
period of time. Table VII shows the timespan between the date
the dispute arose and the date of the complaint to the Bureau.
In some cases the date the dispute arose is difficult to determine. For example, how long does one wait for a building contractor to return to finish a job? How many excuses does the
buyer believe, and at what point does he perceive the excuses
as unreasonable? A certain length of time is necessary to have
defects corrected, and this delays the definition of the situation
as a dispute. Realizing that much subjective judgment was involved, the coders estimated when that condition occurred.
TABLE VII
6

SPAN OF TIME FROM DISPUTE TO CONIPLAINT5

I day
2-7 days
8-30 days
31-90 days

91-180 days
over 180 days

2%
12
24
26

16
20
100% (N = 298)

Gases where timespan could not be determined (151) are omitted.
C6
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Many disputes are relatively old when they are brought
to the Bureau. The variance in the length of time and the actions
taken during that time may reveal differing styles of coping
with disputes. One way to approach the question is to ask to what
extent the differences in the ages of the disputes are accounted
for by bargaining between the parties and by the use of other
third party resources, and to what extent they reflect the characteristics of different complainants. We know from the interviews that lack of knowledge of available resources for help
57
caused much of the delay.
We would expect the initial response of a buyer in coping
with a dispute to be to contact the seller to attempt direct resolution. Caplovitz found that half of the low income consumers
he interviewed did nothing at all, and another 40% complained
to the merchant. He found that only 9% sought "professional"
help, which would include complaining to the Bureau or other
community resources. 58 After the dispute arose but before contacting the Bureau, 72% of the complainants contacted the seller,
9% tried unsuccessfully to contact him, and 19% did not attempt
to make contact. The stereotypical case of fraud in which the
seller disappears after taking the buyer's money is not prevalent
among complaints received by the Bureau.
The length of time from dispute to complaint was accounted
for in part by contact between the parties. Complaints to the
Bureau were made most promptly when no attempt to contact
the seller had been made, and the delay was greatest when the
complainant had attempted to contact the seller and awaited his
response. Table VIII shows the relationship between attempted
contact and delay to complain.
Where there was bargaining activity prior to complaint to
try to settle the dispute, longer delays in complaining occurred.
As long as the bargaining process had not yet broken down,
the complainant apparently saw less need for a third-party resource. Bargaining was coded on the basis of the complainant's
report in the complaint that the seller had bargained, or offered some compromise or partial relief, before complaint to
the Bureau.
Table IX shows the relationship between prior bargaining
and delay in complaining. Almost half (48%) of the complain57 D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 27, at 175, reports finding that 64% of his sample

did not know of resources for help with a consumer dispute.
•1"ld. 171.
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TABLE VIII
BUYER ATrFNIPT TO CONTACT SELLER AND

TIME FROM DISPUTE TO

BUREAU COMPLAINT"
Time from Dispute
to Bureau
Complaint

none
attempted

Under 1 month
1-3 months
3-6 months
Over 6 months

64%
15
10
11

Contact Between Parties
unsuccessful
attempt

26%
33
26
15

100%
(N = 61)

contact

42%
24
14
20
100%
(N = 245)

100%
(N = 27)

ants had taken their disputes to other community resources
before coming to the Bureau, 9% had taken their disputes to
two other resources, and 4% to more than two. Table X shows
TABLE IX
BARGAINING

BETWEEN

PARTIES AND TmE FROM. DISPUTE TO BUREAU COMPLAINT

Time from Dispute
to Bureau
Complaint

Bargaining

Contact but no
Bargaining
(to nearest %)

Under 1 month
1-3 months
3-6 months
Over 6 months

36%
19
17
28

46%
26
13
16

100% (N - 78)

0

101% (N = 167)

the distribution of prior resources used by complainants. Many
informal, but few formal, resources were used; only two complainants had filed lawsuits before complaining to the Bureau.
Complainants who contacted other resources before complaining to the Bureau delayed longer in contacting the Bureau than those who did not. The more prior resources the
complainant had contacted, the longer was the delay. The longest delays were in cases where the prior resource had actively
7,1Chi square test significant at .01 level. Complaints where time to complaint
could not be determined (116) are omitted.
"(Chi square test is significant at .06 level, not within the .05 level at which
findings are conventionally accepted. Complaints where time to complaint could
not be determined (116) and where there was no contact between the parties prior
to Bureau complaint (132) are omitted.
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TABLE X
1
RESOURCES CONTACTED BEFORE BunEAu COMPLAINT'

M ass Media, Action Lines ..............................................

30%

L awyer ...............................................................................
Better Business Bureau .................................................
State's Attorney, Police .................................................
Other Consumer Agency ...............................................
Other Private Resource .................................................
Other Government Agency or Official ......................

25
19
13
12
19
14
132%

(N = 213)

intervened rather than simply advising the complainant, or
doing nothing. Better Business Bureaus and mass media action lines actively intervened relatively often, and delayed complaint to the Bureau in the cases taken to them. Lawyers, where
used, played a more passive role-advising and referring; they
actively intervened in very few cases later complained about
to the Bureau. Lawyers and the media were the most frequent
sources of referrals to the Bureau, each referring about 8%
of the total sample.
It is interesting to note that virtually none of the complainants had taken his grievance to a court before coming to the
Bureau. Complainants who had consulted lawyers sought either
advice or informal intervention, but not the filing of lawsuits.
The range of institutions that the complainants had contacted
prior to coming to the Bureau reveals some information about
the hierarchy of dispute management institutions previously
discussed. 62 Bureau complainants frequently had attempted
to solve their disputes by themselves by direct negotiation with
the seller. They often then sought the intervention of one or
more informal community resources. All of these resources
and the Bureau are located on the informal portion of the continuum described in Figure I. As we shall see, if the Bureau is
unsuccessful in its intervention, it often refers complainants
to the courts. Consumers thus appear to seek the intervention
of a sequence of institutions of increasing formality and resource requirements in dealing with their disputes.
61The total represents 289 resources used by 213 complainants, hence the total
percentage is greater than 100%. Complainants contacting no resources other than
the Bureau (236) are omitted.
62 See Figure I & part I supra.
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THE BUREAU'S RESPONSE TO COMPLAINTS

The nature of the Bureau's response to the complaints can
best be understood by following the typical course of a complaint. More than half of the complaints are received by mail,
either on complaint forms supplied by the Bureau or in informal
letters. The balance of complaints is filed in person at the Bureau's office. As soon as the Bureau receives a complaint, a file
is opened and the case is assigned to a hearing officer. Most of
the hearing officers are lawyers. On the basis of the complaint
alone the hearing officer decides whether or not to contact the
seller to ask for its response to the complaint. When he receives
the seller's response, the hearing officer again reviews the file
and may either close the matter or set an informal hearing to
discuss the dispute. After the hearing, the matter usually is
either settled between the parties or dropped by the Bureau.
Occasionally, complaints are referred to Bureau lawyers for
further investigation, and, perhaps, for litigation. The average
length of processing time from receipt of a complaint to disposition is 2.6 months for all cases, and 3.6 months for those
where the seller is contacted.
Files are closed at three primary disposition points in the
complaint-handling process: (1) when the complaint is received;
(2) when the seller's answer is received; and (3) at the informal
hearing. At each disposition point there are various types of
dispositions: The Bureau may decide that it has no jurisdiction
over the particular seller or the type of business, or that no good
claim has been alleged; the complainant may drop out of the
case by failing to respond further; the Bureau may be unable
to contact the seller; the dispute may be settled; or the matter
may be sent on to be investigated for possible law enforcement
activity, and thus depart from the routine complaint-handling
process. Figure IV shows the proportion of the complaints in
the sample disposed of at each disposition point and the type
of disposition. Each stage of the process will be discussed in
somewhat more detail.
A.

After Receipt of the Complaint:
The Decision to Take Action

Some preliminary screening takes place through verbal discouragement or referral by the receptionists and telephone
operators, and by attrition through the sending of complaint
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FIGURE IV
BUREAU DISPOSITION OF COMPLAINTS

Disposition
Points in
Bureau Process

Flow Chart of Complaint Dispositions
(percentage of all complaints received is indicated)

Complaints Received by Bureau (100%)
1. Initial
screenirng
of com I plaints
No jurisdic- bNo claim
13%)
tion (20%)

Bureau
attempt to
contact seller
(62%)

No further
complainant
response
(3%)

To litiga tion
departm ent
(29,

2. Screening
after selle r/
answers

Dispute
settled
(23%)

No claim
(4%)

Hearing
(18%)

/

\

No further
complainant

Cannot
contact
seller

response

(9%)

To litigation dept.
(2%)

(6%)

3. Informal
hearing

Dispute
settled
(12%)

No claim
(4%)

No further
complainant
response
(1%)

Cannot
contact
seller
(1%)

To litigation dept.
(less than 1/2 of 1%)
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forms that are never returned. The analysis which follows is
based on the complaints received in writing after such attrition. The Bureau's hearing officers make the major screening
decision-the first real disposition point in the process-on the
basis of the written complaints.
Over one-third (38%) of the complaint files are closed at the
initial screening stage. The hearing officers base initial screening decisions on their reading of the complaint and on whatever impressions about the reputation and past conduct of the
seller they carry in their heads. They make no investigation of
the business or other consumers, nor do they check Bureau or
other files about past complaints or investigations. Although
the ubiquitous problems of understaffing, inaccessibility of information, and lack of staff aggressiveness partially explain the
failure to use other sources of information at this and later
stages, these are not the primary explanations. Put simply, this
decision is not based on the business practices of the seller. This
screening is not made from a law enforcement stance, where the
criterion for decision would be the normative quality of the
seller's past conduct; rather, the screening is done primarily
from a dispute settlement perspective-the basis of decision is
the legitimacy of the complainant's problem and whether the
Bureau can help to solve it.
The majority of complaints screened out at this stage are
dropped for lack of jurisdiction, which includes: Seller not in
the state (5%), seller regulated by other state agency (8%), complaint not involving consumer transaction (4%), and other reasons (3%). Such jurisdictional criteria are used quite freely in
disposing of complaints. The factors involved are objective and
do not require contradicting the complainant. In addition, declining jurisdiction because the seller is out of state or separately
regulated allows the Bureau to refer the complainant to another specified resource for help, for example, the consumer
agency of another state or a regulatory agency in the state. This
encourages use of lack of jurisdiction as a basis for disposition.
It is a ready solution to the usual bureaucratic problem of keeping up with the caseload; it closes cases quickly and efficiently.
A total of 20% of the complaints received were screened out
for lack of jurisdiction, and 80% of these complainants were referred by letter to other government agencies. The Bureau
did not follow up on such referrals. Referrals were much less
frequent if the Bureau took jurisdiction and screened the com-
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plaints out for substantive reasons. Only about 40% of the cases
over which the Bureau took jurisdiction and dismissed at this
first disposition point were referred, and referral usually took
the form of advice to see a lawyer or, in a few cases, to use the
pro se small claims court.
Despite the ease of dropping cases for lack of jurisdiction,
the Bureau does on occasion intervene to help a deserving consumer even while deciding that it has no jurisdiction. This happens most often if the hearing officer thinks a letter might easily
solve the problem, for example, an out-of-state department store
63
order which appears to be a random error or billing error.
Most of the remaining cases (13%) screened out at the first
disposition point are closed for substantive reasons-no good
claim is stated in the complaint.6 4 The decision to close the file
on this basis is communicated to the complainant as a finding
that the Bureau has determined that there is no allegation of
65
conduct in violation of the consumer fraud statutes.
The hearing officers say that only about 5% of all complaints
received involve situations appearing to violate the statutes,
and that these stand out clearly. The officers invariably characterize most complaints as arising out of misunderstandings,
inevitable or negligent foul-ups, or breaches of contract which
reasonable people should be able to work out. They describe
the complainants not as victimized, but as not knowing how
to handle their problems or as being a bit unreasonable about
their rights. The hearing officers thus seem to perceive and
screen the complaints almost entirely from a dispute settlement
stance. The decision is based on the hearing officer's judgment
63 Such cases constituted under 2% of the sample and are included in "no jurisdiction" on Figure IV.
6' A few complaints drop out at this point because of the failure of the complainant to answer the Bureau's request for additional information (3%). Some are assigned directly to the litigation department not on the basis of the content of the
complaint, but because the business complained about is already independently
the subject of litigation department concern (2%).
(" The Bureau describes this screening process as review to determine:
whether or not the [Bureau] has jurisdiction over the matter under any
of the applicable statutes. If the complaint does not relate to applicable
statutory sanctions or prohibited methods, or if the complainant is not a
"consumer" within the meaning of the Consumer Fraud Act, the file is
marked "no jurisdiction" and a letter is forwarded to the complainant informing him of our determination and the reasons therefor. We also suggest contacting a private attorney where we feel the complainant has a possible
civil remedy.
[1969-1970] ILL. ATr'Y GEN. CONSUMER FRAUD & PROTECTION Div. BIENNIUM
REP. 3 [hereinafter cited as [1969-70] BIENNIuMNi REP.].
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of the credibility of the complainant, the legitimacy of his problem, his entitlement to assistance, and the likelihood that Bureau intervention would be helpful. It is the strength of the
complainant's request for help, not the appropriateness of the
seller as a subject for possible prosecution (law enforcement),
that governs this decision. I shall refer to this implicit criterion
for screening complaints as the standard of complaint strength.
When the hearing officer decides to act upon a complaint,
he has decided both that a legitimate grievance is stated by the
complaint (the standard of complaint strength) and that Bureau action may help to settle the dispute. 66 No judgment whether the seller has violated the fraud statutes is made at this stage
because it is not relevant to the action of the hearing department. That judgment is suspended pending the processing of
the complaint.
The second implicit screening criterion is what I shall call
the standard of dispute solvability. If it appears that the action
of the Bureau will help the complainant to settle the dispute
without too much effort, the Bureau will intervene even if the
complaint is not serious and does not involve a high probability of fraud; the standard of solvability leads the Bureau to act
on some cases where the complaint is not strong and not to act
where strong complaints appear difficult to resolve. Solvability
of disputes as a screening standard is illustrated by the hearing
officers' occasional intervention in a dispute simultaneous with
their decline of jurisdiction. The hearing officers also indicate
that there is a lower frequency of Bureau intervention in cases
involving defective services or merchandise, which are inherently
more difficult to resolve than cases of nondelivery, incomplete
performance, or credit or billing problems. They also say that
the Bureau intervenes more frequently when the complaint is
against a large business than a small one because large businesses
are more responsive and will settle disputes more often, and because such complaints are more often the results of unintended
errors. Hearing officers indicate that they are more likely to
intervene in a case where the complainant has stated the dispute
in terms of possible private remedies rather than in terms of
punishment of the seller. Complaints that state the complainants' outrage but do not suggest an acceptable outcome indicate
to the hearing officers that they will not be resolved easily and
66 The opposite conclusion is reached in the complaints screened out as "no
claim." No conclusion is reached on these issues in those cases dropped for lack of
jurisdiction.
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TAiBLE XI
BUREAU INTERVENTION AND TYPE OF REmEDY REQUESTEDes
Remedy requested in complaint

Bureau Intervention
No Bureau Intervention

Cancellation

Performance

93%
7
100%
(N = 159)

86%
14
100%
(N = 72)

Restitution

79%
21
100%
(N = 42)

Other and
unspecified

76%
24
100%
(N = 97)

that the Bureau might better use its energies elsewhere if it
wishes to resolve the maximum number of disputes.
The solvability standard is illustrated further by the Bureau's more frequent action on complaints that sought either
completion of performance or cancellation of the transaction
rather than restitution or repair, as Table XI demonstrates.
Performance or cancellation are clearly defined remedies, often
involving situations in which the seller has not performed at
all, and probably are easier to resolve than if no remedy is specified or general restitution is requested. Complaints seeking
completion of performance generally did not accuse the seller
of fraud or misrepresentation, and depicted the seller as unreasonable rather than dishonest; such disputes present fewer
problems of resolution. Complaints seeking cancellation generally were made at a point in the transaction before any performance, and thus were more easily resolved both because
a clear remedy was indicated and because sellers had made
less investment in the transaction.
The use of the standard of solvability is consistent with the
Bureau's dispute settlement stance. The Bureau stands ready to
intervene and to help to settle private consumer disputes. The
Bureau initially perceives complaints as disputes to be settled
rather than as alleged fraud to be investigated for prosecution,
68
though the latter more clearly describes the statutory mandate.
One complaint, for example, came from an employee of a building management concern who charged that his employer was
cheating the public by misrepresenting its janitorial service.
Such a complaint would seem to be important because it is a
new and vital source of information about conduct violative
of the acts that the Bureau was set up to police. In fact, the Bu67 Cases where jurisdiction was
declined for formal rather than substantive
reasons (79) are omitted.
68 See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra; note 69 infra.
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reau's structure is not conducive to response to such a routine
complaint from a complainant with no stake in the dispute.
This complaint was dismissed without action on the ground that
the complainant was an employee, and not a consumer within
the meaning of the Consumer Fraud Act. The Act, however,
does not limit the Bureau's jurisdiction to complaints from parties
with a stake in an active dispute. 6 9 The complaint file implies
that this particular case was closed because the complaint did
not present an active dispute in which the complainant had a
stake or a significant problem to be solved. The hearing officer
apparently saw no occasion for Bureau action.
The Bureau has, in effect, adopted a "case or controversy"
or "standing" criterion similar to that of the courts. By acting
when the complainant's grievance is strong and the Bureau can
easily solve the problem, the Bureau defines itself as a disputesettling institution and a helping resource for aggrieved buyers.
Complaints not arising out of an active dispute between a buyer
and a seller with a request for a private remedy simply are not
congruent with the Bureau's primary dispute settlement stance.
B. Bureau Action on Complaints
Sixty-two percent of the complaints survive the initial screening stage and are acted upon by the Bureau. First, the Bureau
writes a letter to the business complained about, describing the
nature of the complaint and inviting a response. The letter
neither requests any defense to the allegation of fraud nor seeks
evidence of the general business practices of the seller. It presents only the single complaint, and is ambiguous as to whether
11 The

attorney general is empowered to investigate and seek court orders:

[1] When it appears to the Attorney General that a person has engaged in, is
engaging in, or is about to engage in any practice declared to be unlawful by
this Act; [2] when he receives a written complaint from a consumer or borrower of the commission of a practice declared to be unlawful under this Act;

or [3] when he believes it to be in the public interest that an investigation
should be made to ascertain whether a person in fact has engaged in, is engaging in or is about to engage in, any practice declared to be unlawful
by this Act ....

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 2, § 263 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974). Consumer complaint [2]
is only one of three bases on which the Bureau may act. The Act does not require
that the "consumer or borrower" making the complaint be a party to a transaction
with the seller or lender, have a monetary interest in the dispute, or have a special
source of knowledge. Rather than any such notions of privity, interest, or special
information, the Act apparently contemplates that the Bureau will act on informa-

tion from any source whatsoever which causes it to "appear" to the Bureau (cl. [1]
in quoted portion of Act) or causes the Bureau to "believe" (cl. [3]) that an investigation ought to be made.
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it is an accusation of fraud (requiring a defense) or a request
for a private remedy.
The form letter sent to the business complained against exhibits the equivocal relationship between the Bureau's formal
statutory purpose as a law enforcement agency and its adopted,
informal, dispute-settling function. The letter is the Bureau's
intervention as a third party for the primary purpose of affecting the outcome of a two-party dispute. The form letter states:
On
, 19 , the above-named consumer filed
a complaint with this office alleging that you violated
one or more of the Illinois consumer fraud and protection statutes.
The following is a brief summary of the allegations
against you.
You have the right to respond to these allegations.
Your response must be sent within five days of your receipt of this letter. If your response does not demonstrate clearly that there is no substantial claim, the
matter will be set for hearing in the near future.
It is our sincere hope that this matter may be resolved without delay.
Very truly yours,
Although the letter speaks of allegations of violation of the
consumer fraud statutes, it also speaks of a response which
would "demonstrate that there is no substantial claim," and
states the hope that the matter may be resolved without delay.
What sort of a response could clearly negate an allegation of
fraud? It takes only a little reading between the lines to conclude that the matter will be considered closed if the "claim"
is remedied or a satisfactory answer to it is given. The law enforcement stance and the dispute settlement stance are mixed
in the letter. This implication is strengthened by the complaint
summary inserted in the form letter. It is normally described
from the point of view of the complainant stating his particular
problem. In many cases, the hearing officer goes on to state
specifically what he thinks the seller ought to do to take care
of the problem. Seldom does the hearing officer simply say
that the violation of a certain statute has been alleged, without
going on to suggest an acceptable resolution.
The hearing officer assumes a dual role. On the one hand
he plays the role of advocate for the complainant, on the other,
the role of mediator. Neither role is related to law enforcement.
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Both are related to the solution of the concrete dispute rather
than to the application of legal norms that would be involved
in the more formal function of law enforcement. When he decides to write the letter, the hearing officer considers what might
be an equitable settlement. He considers the seller's probable
interests as well as the complainant's stated interests.
The Bureau does not discuss with the complainant what
remedy would be satisfactory to him. Unless the complainant
requests a specific remedy, the Bureau must decide what resolution is possible and equitable. Even where a specific remedy is
requested, the Bureau may seek a different one. The specific
settlements which the hearing officers suggested were generally
less favorable to complainants than the specific demands. Although the hearing officer takes the side of the complainant
in presenting the dispute to the seller, he tempers the demand
by his own notions of fairness. He normally does not suggest
compensation for delays or loss of use or income. Suggestions
of refunds generally allow the seller some allowance for work
already performed, most frequently in cases where a partially
performed contract is to be canceled. Often, the suggested remedy is an outright compromise. When complainants seek refunds
or terminations of relationships, the Bureau commonly converts these into requests for repair, replacement, or completion
of performance. The Bureau tends to request completion of
performance rather than cancellation, and repair rather than
refund. Such transformations of the buyer's demands are, in
effect, compromises, because the seller will lose less by retaining some of its profit from the transaction. Such transformations seem to reflect both notions of equity and judgments of
what can be obtained without undue effort. The hearing officer's judgment of a fair outcome, not the complainant's, governs the Bureau's demands to sellers. Complainants do not,
in fact, know what the Bureau has written to sellers and might
not approve if they did.
Some examples will illustrate this transformation, the mixture of advocacy and mediation, and the problem-solving nature
of the intervention. One complainant's statement read:
I want my money back. That swindler sold me a TV
he knew was full of broken down old parts that would
never work. It must have been dropped on the ground
or second hand or something. I'll never go near him
again.

1975]

CONSUMER COMPLAINTS

This was communicated to the seller as follows:
It is alleged that you sold a television set to the above
party that was not in proper repair. We suggest that you
repair or replace it promptly.
Another complainant wrote:
X came to repair my plumbing. He did such a lousy
job and made such a mess of my house that I had to
hire another plumber and a painter to put it back together again. I paid X $150 only to have everything
ruined for weeks. Then I had to shell out $325 more
to correct what he did.
The hearing officer stated this complaint to the seller in this way:
Q states that the plumbing repair work you performed
for him was defective and that further work was required to correct it. It seems to us that some adjustment of the price would be appropriate under the circumstances.
A third complainant had sent away for a.kitchen gadget from a
small and distant mail order house. The Bureau wrote simply
"Ship the merchandise ordered or refund the money at once."
The Bureau does not merely ask the seller for his side of the
dispute; rather, the Bureau approaches the seller as an advocate
for the complainant's legitimate demands as redefined by the
hearing officer.
The complaint letter itself is rarely forwarded to the seller.
Although having hearing officers summarize complaints generates more work for the Bureau, it serves several important
functions. First, it clarifies the complaint. The hearing officer
must glean the central issue from an often rambling and unfocused complaint that makes many accusations and demands.
He must ascertain the crux of the complaint, determine an equitable settlement, and then state this information in a short paragraph. The concise restatement of the complaint serves to narrow the issues, to strip them of their hostile emotional content,
and to state the problem as a request for the seller to remedy
a specific problem. The hearing officer may well be able to isolate the problem and define an achievable solution better than
the complainant. In addition, the restatement by an assistant
attorney general who is both an objective third party and an expert seems greatly to increase the legitimacy of the complaint
in the eyes of the business receiving the letter.
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One can only speculate whether the business responds primarily to the clarification and objectification of the complaint
or to the implicit threat of law enforcement action. The official
restatement of the complaint is a means of communicating the
complaint's new status to the seller. Often the seller has ignored
the buyer before Bureau action; often the buyer is dissatisfied
with the action taken by the seller in response to his complaint.
Once the Bureau indicates its interest, and, implicitly, its agreement with the complainant that further seller action would be
appropriate, the complaint receives a new legitimacy and a new
status-the state has taken official notice of it. The seller sees
the complaint as a priority matter and he reviews it again, this
time with a predisposition to see merit in the complainant's
position now that the state has intervened and joined the complainant.
C. After the Business Responds:
The Second DispositionPoint
At this point in the process, the second major disposition
point is reached.7 0 The Bureau now has the complaint and the
seller's response to the Bureau's statement, and must decide
whether to take further action. If the case is not closed, the
next step normally is to set an informal hearing on the complaint, but on occasion the Bureau sends additional letters and
makes additional telephone calls to the seller. The criteria of
decision at this point are closely related to the standards of complaint strength and solvability implicitly used at the first disposition point.
Some sellers could not be contacted by the Bureau. The
hearing officer typically made little effort to locate the seller,
although in a few cases an investigator was sent to the address
given. When the Bureau's letter was returned as undeliverable
or when the Bureau knew from other sources that the seller
Assuming that the respondent informs [the Bureau] of facts which
clearly negate any fraud and that [the Bureau] is satisfied that such response is a true and accurate description of the transaction complained
of, then the file is closed and marked, "no jurisdiction-investigation" (NJI),
and the complainant is so informed with our reasons for not accepting the
file accompanying the refusal letter.
Typically, arrangements are often made between the parties at this
stage with the [Bureau] playing a mediator role. Voluntary settlements
negotiated by the parties are discovered by the [Bureau] through a system
of "status" letters to both the complainant and the respondent. Settlements
are recorded on the file and statistics entered.
[1969-1970] BIENNIUM REP., supra note 65, at 3-4.
70
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could not be reached (together, 7% of the complaints), the normal
course was to send a letter to the complainant saying that the
Bureau was unable to locate the seller and that unless the complainant could supply a better address, no further action could
be taken. Unless the complainant sent a new address-a rare
occurrence-the case was closed.
Seventy-three percent of the businesses contacted by the
Bureau responded to the initial letter, almost all within the five
days specified in the form letter. Of those cases in which the
businesses did not respond, 70% (15% of the total sample) were
set for hearings, 15% (2% of the total sample) were dismissed
when the complainant failed to respond to the Bureau's further
inquiry as to the status of the matter, 71 and 15% (2% of the total
sample in addition to the 7% where the Bureau knew the seller
had not been contacted) were dismissed on the basis that the
business could not be contacted.
The first criterion used at this disposition point is the equity
of the solution offered by the seller. This judgment depends both
upon the remedy the seller has offered, if any, and upon a reassessment of the strength of the complaint in light of seller's
answer. Cases are invariably closed at this point if the seller
indicates that it has given a complete remedy. When a seller
indicates that it has taken or will take some action, the Bureau
takes its word for it without any follow-up, leaving it to the complainant to inform the Bureau if the proffered action is not
taken. The problems of leaving follow-up to complainant prodding will be discussed when the outcomes of the Bureau action
are examined.
Thirty-seven percent of the cases where the seller responded
(23% of the total sample) were closed on the basis of the seller's
offer to settle the dispute by doing part or all of what the buyer
requested. Four percent of the cases were closed with the formal
finding that no fraud had occurred, based in most cases on the
7 The form letter to the complainant inquiring about the status of the matter
entirely adopts a dispute settling stance. It reads as follows:
Please be advised that this office is still reviewing the above complaint. We
would appreciate hearing from you as to what disposition might have been
made in this matter between you and the above named respondent since
this office has last been in contact with you. Upon receipt of the information, this office will contact you as to whether the matter in question warrants action under "An Act to Prevent Consumer Fraud."
If the matter has been settled, we would appreciate notification of the
same. If not, please contact us as to the present status of the controversy.
Unless we hear from you within the next ten days by mail, we will assume that you do not want to pursue this matter further.
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hearing officer's decision after reading the seller's answer that
the complainant was not entitled to relief.
The dispute solvability standard is also used at this second
disposition point. The hearing officer judges whether or not
further Bureau action is likely to result in an outcome significantly more favorable to the complainant. Where, for example,
a seller's answer disputes the facts of the complaint and offers
nothing, hearing officers appear more likely to close the case
than where the seller generally agrees about what had happened but takes issue with its liability or its fraud, or alleges
mitigating circumstances. The apparent reason for this is the
hearing officers' opinion that disagreements over facts are intractable and difficult to settle. Where the issues are drawn
as disagreements about the facts, they are apparently less susceptible to bargaining and compromise and thus to mediation
than where the issues concern liability on agreed facts. The
Bureau, then, applies what we have called the solvability standard to conserve its hearing resources by using them mainly
in those disputes where it seems most likely to be able to obtain
additional relief for the complainant.
The second disposition point in the complaint handling process of the Bureau is governed by the same two related but separate criteria which govern the first disposition point. The main
determinant of disposition is whether the seller has offered a
remedy to the complaint that solves the problem. Cases are
closed if the seller promises a full solution-the solution requested by the complainant and/or the hearing officer. If less
than a full solution or none at all is offered, the Bureau applies its
dual criteria of complaint strength and solvability. The strength
of the complaint, its size, and the appearance of misrepresentation impel the Bureau to carry the case on to a hearing. The
apparent solvability of the dispute-the request for a specific
private remedy, the indication of willingness to bargain, the
perception of the dispute as a conflict of interest and not one
of values-also impel the Bureau to hold a hearing rather than
to dispose of the case at this point.
All of the cases where full solutions are promised are closed,
and about half of those where less than a total solution is offered
also are closed. Upon closing a file with some solution, the Bu72
reau sends a form letter to the complainant.
72 The form letter reads as follows:

We have been advised by the above named company/individual

that
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The assumptions that the Bureau makes in disposing of cases
at this point in the process show a curious mixture of roles. The
hearing officers do not represent the complainants in an official
sense. Yet the hearing officers accept compromises on behalf
of complainants, without obtaining the complainants' agreement, as a mediator would do. Although the hearing officers see
themselves as acting for the complainants, they substitute their
own judgments in deciding when disputes are resolved equitably
and when problems are solved. Resolution thus means not that
both parties are satisfied but that the third party is satisfied with
the equity of the outcome. The Bureau, however, is not a court.
The hearing officers do not act like judges-they do not issue
decisions, or have the power to do so. Instead they leave to the
seller the initiative of offering potential solutions and apply
their standards only negatively to decide whether resolution
is to be further encouraged by an informal hearing. The Bureau's decision is based on a judgment of the equity of the case
and on the likelihood of obtaining more for the complainant.
The decision is not, except in extreme cases, based upon legal
rules of liability or upon judgments of the cause of the dispute
or the existence of fraudulent conduct.
This set of assumptions is congruent with the Bureau's
primary stance of dispute settlement. Once this stance is adopted,
the task of the Bureau is defined as moving the seller to an acceptable compromise position somewhere between the original
positions of the parties, unless the seller can demonstrate that the
complainant is entitled to nothing at all.
D. Informal Hearings
Informal Bureau hearings were held on 18% of the complaints in the sample, 23% of the cases over which the Bureau
had jurisdiction. These hearings are private, held in the hearing officers' cramped offices. If more than four people were
present, some would have to sit on window sills or stand. Telephone calls often interrupt the proceedings. The contrast to
the public atmosphere of a courtroom is striking. Usually only
the hearing officer, the buyer, and the seller are present (though
they ]lave contacted you relative to your complaint, and that they have adjusted the matter to your satisfaction.
Will you please check one of the boxes below and return this letter to
our office so that we may close our file.
o The Company has adjusted my complaint. Please close my file.
o The Company has NOT adjusted my complaint. Explain.
The Bureau received very few responses to this letter.
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in 16% of the hearings the seller's lawyer was also present).
People unrelated to the hearing in process wait outside in a
reception area.
The procedure also is informal. The Bureau's rules provide
for such formal legal rights as subpoenas, presentation of evidence, objection to and exclusion of evidence, argument by the
parties, the taking of oaths, and written decisions, but such
formalities are seldom observed. Some lawyers representing
sellers at informal hearings attempt to operate formally as if
they were in a courtroom (with opening and closing arguments,
objections to evidence, and cross-examination). The hearing officers usually resist such formalities and, if necessary, tell the
attorney such formalities are out of place. At one hearing I attended, an officer said with some annoyance to the seller's lawyer, who had objected to something the complainant said: "Be
quiet and let me hear what he has to say. This isn't a trial, you
know. We're simply trying to settle this complaint against your
client."
TABLE XII
PARTIES

PRESENT

AT

BUREAU HFARINGS"

Both parties (unrepresented) ....................................
Both parties plus seller's lawyer .............................
Complainant only .................................
Seller only ..................................................................

59%
18
15
8

100% (N = 72)

Both parties generally were present at hearings. Table XII
shows those parties present at hearings held on the complaints
in the sample. When the seller is present but the complainant is absent without excuse, the case usually is dismissed. When
the complainant is present but the seller is not, the hearing officer generally attempts to call the seller and negotiate over
the telephone. If the seller cannot be contacted, the hearing
officer generally shifts to a counseling stance toward the complainant-advising him where to go for help (usually a lawyer or
the small claims court).7 4 Where both parties were present, the
role of the hearing officer was a blend of mediator and judge,
73

Cases where parties present at hearing could not be determined from records

(8) are omitted.
,' The impressions are based mainly on discussions with hearing officers and
complainants and brief notes about hearings found in the complaint files, because
my observation of hearings included only two where one party was absent.
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although the Bureau's rules seem to characterize him more as
a judge. 5
The hearings usually were opened by the hearing officer's
stating the problem.7 6 There usually was silence while the hearing officer talked, with no interruption until the parties got a
feel for what was expected of them. The hearing officer normally
stated the problem from the complainant's point of view, somewhat objectified and modified by the officer's judgment of which
parts of the complaint were legitimate, and stripped of the more
emotional aspects of the complaint. After several minutes, one
party ordinarily interrupted to object to the statement. The
cases were about evenly divided as to which party did so first.
The objection tended to broaden the area of conflict substantially
by interjecting related but separate transactions, emotional
overtones, and peripheral relationships. At this point, tempers
began to rise, and the dispute started to erupt within the hearing. The task of the hearing officer was then to keep the parties
75 The Bureau's Rules of Procedure provide:
Rule 6. CONDUCT OF HEARING. A hearing is an informal proceeding. The parties shall appear before a duly assigned Hearing Officer. Opportunity shall be afforded to the complainant and respondent to present
evidence and argument on all issues involved and to cross-examine all witnesses who have testified. The Hearing Officer may question any party
or witness.
[The Bureau] may, on its own motion, subpoena witnesses or tangible
evidence. A party may, within a reasonable time before the hearing date,
request [the Bureau] to subpoena witnesses or tangible evidence. Such request shall be granted when the Hearing Officer deems it appropriate.
Any relevant evidence which is not privileged is admissible without
regard to whether such evidence is hearsay or otherwise inadmissible in a
court of law. The Hearing Officer may exclude irrelevant, immaterial or
unduly repetitious evidence.
Each party has the right to representation by counsel at his own expense.
Either party or [the Bureau] may cause the hearing to be transcribed
at his or its own expense.
The Hearing Officer may make a finding, based on substantial evidence,
that a violation of any statute under [the Bureau's] jurisdiction has occurred.
The finding shall be reflected in a written order. The respondent and complainant shall be notified either personally or by mail of any such finding
or order.
A Hearing Officer may administer an oath or affirmation to any person upon request of either party or upon his own initiative.
A Hearing Officer may expel any party or attorney from any hearing
for improper, disorderly, or contemptuous conduct.
ILL. ATT'Y GEN., CONSUMER FRAUD & PROTECTION Div. RULES & REGULATIONS,
R. 6.
76 The description and analysis of informal Bureau hearings which follows is
based on my observation of 40 hearings. Although my impressions are necessarily
subjective, they were confirmed generally by my discussions with Bureau staff,
complainants and businesses, and by the sample complainants interviewed, half
of whom had attended hearings.
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focused on the narrow dispute as he had defined it. He had
to calm them so that they would accept his definition of the
matter as a limited and solvable problem rather than as a matter of principle and a battle of wills where each party's "face"
was at stake-the complainant's on the issue whether he had
been "taken" in the original transaction, the seller's on whether
he would be defeated at the hearing. The task was to transform
the dispute from an issue of principle into a solvable problem.
Aubert's distinction between "conflict of interest" and "conflict of values" is useful in conceptualizing the dynamics of the
informal hearings. Aubert has written:
A conflict of interest between two actors stems from a
situation of scarcity. Both [parties] want "the same
thing," but there is not enough of it available for each
to have what he wants. In this general sense the basis
for a conflict is present in all trading transactions. The
seller would like to have more money than the buyer
is willing to part with, or he would like to withhold a
quantity of the produce which the buyer wants to acquire. This conflict potential is eliminated through
the operation of the market, usually so smoothly that
no overt signs of conflict appear. If a conflict comes
into the open, the solution will often be a compromise.
Each party concedes to reduce his demands until an
agreement is reached, although possibly still believing
that he is contributing too much. This agreement is,
therefore, not to be interpreted as an ethical commitment to the price as an expression of the just terms of
exchange. It is merely to be interpreted as an expression of what [the parties], under the given market conditions, find it in their own interests to do.
A conflict of value is based upon a dissensus concerning the normative status of a social object.
One may raise the question whether conflicts of
values can be avoided in the same fashion as interest
conflicts, e.g., by compromise and mutual resignation
relative to what seems the ideal solution. It is no doubt
possible to formulate statements that contain some
elements from one system of values or description and
some from another. Such compromises are frequently
reached in negotiations between organizations who
want to substitute cooperation for competition. The
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terms of exchange are, however, very uncertain in such
dealings. A scent of the illicit often pervades such
dealings: "one cannot trade in values," "ideas are not
for sale," "no bargain with truth," etc. This illicit nature of compromise on the level of value and of empirical truth makes it hard to discuss matters quite
candidly, thereby decreasing the chances of reaching
a solution. One reason for this, I suppose, is that on
the level of dissensus
it is hard to tell what is "give"
77
and what is "take."
The hearing officer's task at the hearing is to impose on the
parties the definition of the dispute as a conflict of interest. As
we have already seen in analyzing the complaints received
by the Bureau, complainants often present their cases as conflicts of interest; yet, when face-to-face with the seller during a
hearing, there is often a tendency, as emotions rise, for the conflict of value elements to increase in importance relative to the
conflict of interest elements of the dispute.
The hearing officers press sellers to "look the complainant
in the eye" and admit the existence of the problems. Similarly,
they press complainants to admit the sellers' good faith and to
try to view the dispute from the sellers' point of view. If the
conflict of interest definition of the dispute can be sustained,
the problem usually is solved because neither party then can
fail to be "reasonable" and accept a compromise. If the conflict
of value definition ultimately prevails, the settlement of the
dispute is infrequent. After trying to impose the conflict of interest definition on the dispute, the hearing officer usually attempts to persuade each party to accept his view of what has
occurred and to suggest a specific settlement. Such suggested
settlements are usually to split the difference between the hearing
officer's definitions of the legitimate positions of the parties. The
hearing officers say that most of their recommendations are
accepted, and the hearings I observed confirmed this. Most
of the complainants interviewed said that both they and the
sellers were more willing to bargain about the dispute after the
intervention of the hearing officer than either had been before,
and that the final resolution was the one he had suggested. Of
the thirty-eight hearings I attended where both parties were
7Aubert, Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict and of Conflict Resolution, 7 J. CONFL. RESOLUTION 26, 27-29 (1963).
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present, only five resulted in the complainant's obtaining everything he originally thought he was entitled to. In some of the
remaining cases, on the basis of the hearing the complainant
changed his mind on his entitlement and then got all of that.
In the majority of cases, however, the outcome was a compromise
based on what the seller would yield and the officer's judgment
of the equitable outcome.
If no solution could be reached during the hearing, the hearing officer was obliged to confess his powerlessness to the complainant. As one hearing officer put it, "We can't do any more
for you, you'll have to go and see a private lawyer or legal aid.
Even if we file suit for you, it will take several years to get an
order and we cannot assure you that you will ever get any money."
Ultimately, the Bureau is not in a position to file individual
lawsuits for complainants, although the statute gives it power
to seek restitution in addition to other remedies. Once again,
what I have termed the standard of solvability comes into playif a dispute cannot be settled during the hearing it will normally
be dropped as unsolvable after a reasonable allocation of Bureau resources.
The intervention of the Bureau into disputes is a form of
mediation, a blend of the elements of informal problem solving and of more formal adjudication or arbitration. As Aubert
has written,
If conflicts move towards a solution they may do so in
one of two major ways, through bargaining and compromise and through law and the application of norms
to established facts. In a sense the former conflict-solving mechanism presupposes that the conflict is handled as a conflict of interest, while the latter presupposes that it be handled as a dissensus over facts or
norms ....
[A] variety of conflict-solving mechanisms,
intermediary between law and bargaining, are of great
interest. A market price may solve conflicts in a way
reminiscent of law, as may arbitration, while mediation
78
must be considered a modified type of bargaining.
Aubert seems to be referring to the portion of the dispute management continuum I have described (see Figure I) which lies
between the informal pole and the central portion of the continuum. Aubert summarizes the attributes of these two modes
78

Id. 33.
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of dispute settlement appropriate to the two types of conflict
in the form of a list of contrasting characteristics, set out in Figure V. Aubert's "bargain model" lies close to the informal pole
of the continuum, his "court model" in the central portion of it.
FIGURE V
AUBERT'S

Two

MODELS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Court Model

79

BargainModel

a.

triad

a.

dyad

b.

coercive power

b.

no coercive power

c.

application of highly
valued norms

c.

pursuit of interests (values)

d.

establishment of past facts
(guilt)

d.

not necessary to establish
past facts

e.

retroactively oriented
reasoning

e.

prospectively oriented
reasoning

f.

legal experts participate
(that is, judge)

f.

no legal experts participate

g.

conclusion is a verdict

g.

conclusion is an agreement

h.

purely distributive
decision

h.

distributive/generative
decision

i.

either/or decision

i.

a compromise

j.

reaffirmation

j.

no necessary implication
concerning validity

k.

affinity to legal scholarship

k.

affinity to science or
utilitarian thinking

The Bureau lies between the court and bargain models of
dispute intervention. Although these two models are described
as two separate ideal types, they are, I think, to be interpreted as
the two endpoints of a continuum of institutions, as Aubert
acknowledges when he refers to the "variety of conflict-solving
mechanisms, intermediary between law and bargaining. ' 8 0 One
could go further, as Abel has attempted to do,"' and analyze
the continuum as a series of separate variables which may or
" The chart is set out in Nader, Styles of Court Procedure: To Make the Balance,
in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 87 (L. Nader ed. 1969).
,oSee text accompanying note 78 supra.
"' Abel, supra note 12, at 241 et seq.
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may not vary together as Aubert implies that they do. By this
analysis, the institutions intermediary between the two poles or
models might be closer to one model on some variables, and
closer to the other model on other variables.
The initial Bureau intervention by letter seems in many respects close to Aubert's bargain model. As we have seen, the
Bureau acts at this stage primarily as the consumer's advocate
in pursuit of the consumer's interests as interpreted by the Bureau. While there is a third party present there is little coercion
or assertion of interests separate from those of the parties themselves. The transaction, though not strictly dyadic, is not a fully
developed triad because the third party acts in large part on
behalf of one of the other parties. The letter intervention is
primarily prospectively oriented and seeks a generative compromise agreement, not a decision about past facts or a verdict
on the normative quality of past conduct or present positions.
Bureau hearings resemble the court model somewhat more
than does Bureau letter intervention. In Bureau hearings the
third-party presence is fully developed and unequivocal. The
hearing officer no longer acts as a representative of the consumer, but adopts the role of a more neutral mediator whose
independent interests include the application of valued norms
to ensure that an equitable outcome is reached as well as the
resolution of the conflict before him. The hearing officers press
for compromise agreements that they feel are equitable, not
simply what the parties could be induced to accept, although
the basis for the resolution or termination of the dispute remains a bargained agreement rather than a coerced decision.
The retroactive assessment of facts by the legal expert (the hearing officer) and the exploration of past conduct for a determination of guilt sometimes takes place during hearings, but it remains a part of the process of mediation and persuasion rather
than becoming an attempt to reach an all-or-none distributive
verdict. Bureau hearings thus may be characterized as a form
of mediation which shares the elements of the bargain and
court models suggested by Aubert, and which is located somewhere in the lower (informal) region of the dispute management institution continuum set out in Figure I.
Fuller has described the central quality of mediation as "its
capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that
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will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another. 81 2 Mediation as practiced by the Bureau hearing officers
in informal hearings is aimed at reorienting the parties toward
each other, not by applying rules to the case at hand but by encouraging the parties to reassess their dispute and their prior
positions. This process does not, however, rise to the ideal level
implicit in Fuller's words whereby new and shared perceptions
are created. Simmel has described the process of mediation as
follows:
A third mediating social element deprives conflicting
claims of their affective qualities because it neutrally
formulates and presents these claims to the two parties
involved. Thus this circle that is fatal to all reconciliation is avoided: the vehemence of the one no longer
provokes that of the other, which in turn intensifies
that of the first, and so forth, until the whole relationship breaks down. Furthermore, because of the nonpartisan, each party to the conflict not only listens to
more objective matters but is also forced to put the
issue in more objective terms than it would if it confronted the other without mediation. For now it is important for each to win over even the mediator. This,
however, can be hoped for only on purely objective
grounds, because the mediator is not the arbitrator,
but only guides the process of coming to terms; because, in other words, he must always keep' out of any
decision-whereas the arbitrator ends up by taking sides.
Within the realm of sociological techniques, there is
nothing that serves the reconciliation of conflicting
parties so effectively as does objectivity, that is, the
attempt at limiting all complaints and requests to their
objective contents. 83
The result seems more often to be the achievement of mutual
resignation to partially fulfilled interests. Mediation by the Bureau involves processes such as those described by Fuller and
by Simmel, but also involves the ever-present though usually
unstated threat of Bureau prosecution, investigation, and public
exposure. The tenor and variety of methods employed by Bureau hearing officers in informal hearings seem more akin to
82 Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 So. CAL L. REv. 305, 325 (1971).
83

THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL

147-48 (K. Wolff ed. 1950).
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what Cohen describes in writing of the realities of the contemporary Chinese legal system:
[The concept of mediation] refers to the range of methods by which third persons seek to resolve a dispute
without imposing a binding decision. The... mediator
may merely perform the function of an errand boy
who maintains contact between parties who refuse
to talk to one another. At the other end of the spectrum, he may not only establish communication between
parties, but may also define the issues, decide questions of fact, specifically recommend the terms of a
reasonable settlement-perhaps even give a tentative or
advisory decision-and mobilize such strong political,
economic, social and moral pressures upon one or both
parties as to leave little option but that of "voluntary"
acquiescence.8 4
The styles of mediation used in informal hearings vary
among the hearing officers. Although there are procedural rules
for the conduct of such hearings, there are no set substantive
rules for the fair settlement of disputes because, according to
the rules, the hearings are an investigatory stage of a law enforcement process. The result is a highly individualized process
of dispute settlement in which the specific methods of mediation used and the standards of equity applied vary among the
individual mediators.
E.

The Law Enforcement Response

The law enforcement response of the Bureau is embodied
in and effectuated by the Bureau's litigation activity. The litigation department consists of four lawyers and handles all of the
investigation and litigation for the metropolitan area. One not
acquainted with the Bureau's functioning might assume, based
on a casual analogy to criminal law agencies, that the litigation
department takes action on the most serious cases as determined
by the hearing department. On closer examination it appears
that the litigation department operates independently of the
complaint-handling process of the hearing department. The law
enforcement and complaint-processing functions are performed
by separate groups that act almost like separate agencies-each
with its own stance (in fact they are called separate "departments"
'4

Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54

CAL. L. REV.

1201 (1966).
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by Bureau staff). The "hearing department" processes complaints and the "litigation department," located at the other end
of the suite of offices, handles investigations in addition to litigation. Complaints normally do not move through a series of
screenings to litigation, as in the typical prosecutorial agency;
rather, litigation investigations are initiated independently of
single complaints. The overwhelming majority (96%) of the complaints received by the Bureau are disposed of by the hearing
department at one of the three disposition points examined
above.8 5 A tiny fraction of the complaints (0.4%) go through the
complaint-handling process and move on to the litigation department for investigation, subpoena enforcement, or litigation. The remaining 4% of the complaints that go to litigation
are shifted out of the complaint-handling process in midstream
because the seller has become the object of litigation department interest on the basis of information obtained independently of the complaint-handling process.
The factors that trigger investigation for possible law enforcement action are not well understood. The standards under
which discretion to investigate and prosecute is exercised are
always difficult to decipher s6 The contents of the files were
ambiguous, and the attorneys were vague and uncooperative in
discussing this subject except for saying that when many similar
complaints are filed against a business it is investigated. Although
the Bureau does not systematically monitor the number of complaints against individual businesses, Table XIII demonstrates
that Bureau investigation is in fact more frequent in cases where
numerous complaints have been received.
Table XIII is based on the complaints in the sample and
litigation department records and analyzes the relationship between the number of Bureau complaints against a business and
the likelihood of litigation department investigation. Table XIII
illustrates that litigation department activity is infrequent in
cases where few complaints are received, although other selection criteria appear to be operating. Table XIV summarizes the
Bureau's litigation activity for the year 1972. Table XIV is based
on information from the Bureau's docket and complaint index
85 Summarized in Figure IV supra.
86 F.

MIILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME

(1969); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960).

1170

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vot. 123:1107

TABLE XIII
NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST BUSINESSES IN SAMPLE
PERCENTAGE INVESTIGATED FOR LMGATION
Number of
Complaints
Against Business

COMPARED WITH

s

% of
Sample

% Investigated
for Litigation

One
2-4
5-10
11-15

39%
18
19
5

3%
1
4
22

16-25

5

24

26-50

9

55

51-75
over 75

3
2

33
33

100%
(N'= 34)

(N = 385)

and analyzes all litigation activities for the year, not only those
related to complaints in the sample described in Table XIII.
Subpoena enforcement litigation is excluded from this analysis
because it is procedural in nature and not substantive law enforcement. 88 As Table XIV demonstrates, a sizable proportion
of investigations and lawsuits are initiated in cases where few or
no complaints have been received, again indicating that the
number of complaints is not the only standard that determines
the cases to be investigated.
Hearing officers wrote occasional memoranda informing
the litigation department of patterns of conduct that had become apparent to them in handling individual complaints, and
suggesting further investigation. These memoranda were often
very specific, documented with references to specific complaint
files and sometimes outside evidence. The hearing officers
felt disillusioned, however, about the chances of the litigation
department's acting on any of their requests for litigation. According to them, the memoranda usually were ignored. The
litigation department had neither investigated nor acted upon
any of the few memoranda in the sample of complaint files.
The litigation department files examined were rarely based on
17 N is the total ntunber of businesses in the sample-there were 449 complaints
against 402 businesses. Cases in which the number of complaints could not be determined (17) are omitted. N1 is the total number of businesses in the sample which
were investigated by the litigation department.
1s During 1972 the Bureau filed 57 subpoena enforcement suits, 86% against
businesses with less than 5 complaints.

CONSUMER COMPLAINTS

1975]

TABLE XIV
LITIGATION DEPARTMENT

ACTivn-y

DURING

1972

Number of Bureau
Complaints Against

Injunction Suits
& Assurances
of Voluntary

Pending
Investi-

Businesses Involved

Compliance Signed

gations

None
One
2-4
5-10
11-15
16-25
26-50
51-75
76-100
over 100

17%
15
11
17
11
8
11
3
2
5
100%
(N = 61)

11%
25
19
16
7
8
9
2
2
1
100%
(N = 198)

such memoranda; rather, the litigation investigations and subsequent enforcement appear to be based on information received directly by the litigation lawyers from sources other than
complainants. Some Bureau staff members said that trade associations, newspapers, reporters, government officials, or influential individuals frequently provided information and even
applied pressure inducing the litigation department to act. This
may be caused in part by the primary dispute settlement stance
of the hearing department toward complaints, which neither
changes easily to a law enforcement stance nor relates well to a
distinct group with a law enforcement stance.
The dispute settlement stance of the hearing department
in its complaint processing is strong and colors the perception
of an accusation received from an "interested party" to the
dispute-a complainant. Such accusations tend to be discounted
as growing out of feelings aroused by the dispute. This attitude
seems to influence even the litigation department's reaction to
hearing officers' memoranda suggesting law enforcement. One
litigation attorney disregarded a memorandum as simply expressing the annoyance of the hearing officer with a business
that had been "giving him trouble" by refusing to attend hearings or settle complaints-it was nothing but a "personal vendetta of the hearing officer." Some impetus from outside often
seems to be required to focus the litigation department's atten-
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tion on a particular seller and to label that seller as a candidate
for law enforcement. Becker has suggested that rules are enforced only when someone provokes their enforcement:
First, enforcement of a rule is an enterprising act.
Someone-an entrepreneur-must take the initiative
in punishing the culprit. Second, enforcement occurs
when those who want the rule enforced publicly bring
the infraction to the attention of others . . . . Put another way, enforcement occurs when someone blows
the whistle. Third, people blow the whistle, making
enforcement necessary, when they see some advantage
in doing so. 89
Complainants are not perceived as such entrepreneurs; the
Bureau typically views them not as blowing the whistle on a culprit to be punished but as seeking help in resolving a dispute
with a seller. The analysis of complaints presented in this Article suggests that this is a correct perception of the typical
complainant's motives. The dispute settlement stance of the
Bureau is premised upon that perception. The entrepreneurial
role is left to those others who have interests in seeing businesses prosecuted rather than in having private disputes settled. The hearing officers occasionally attempt the entrepreneurial role themselves, often unsuccessfully. The litigation lawyers act as entrepreneurs in initiating some law enforcement.
But much of the entrepreneurial initiative for Bureau law enforcement comes from sources outside the Bureau.
The law enforcement activity of the Bureau is summarized
in Table XV, which shows all litigation matters closed during
1972. As the table indicates, 58% of the Bureau's litigation activity involved the enforcement of subpoenas. Of the 57 subpoena suits, 11 were successful and the business appeared for
a hearing, 15 resulted in settlements, 13 could not be served,
and 18 were dismissed for various reasons. Only 32% of the
matters handled by the litigation department involved substantive law enforcement, as opposed to preliminary investigations.
Of the 41 law enforcement matters, 10 resulted in assurances
of voluntary compliance (promises not to engage in consumer
fraud, carrying no sanction or admission of past fraud but usable
as prima facie evidence in a subsequent lawsuit based on their
89 H. BECKER, Supra note 1, at 122.
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violation), and 19 were dismissed without court-imposed sanction
(6 of these were settled with restitution). Only 12 matters resulted
in court orders of law enforcement (5 of those by default).
TABLE XV
LrIGATIoN DEPA TmtENT MATTERS CLOSED IN 197290

Subpoena Enforcement Suits
appeared for hearing
settled
cannot locate
dismissed
Total

11%
15
13
19
58

Total Assurances of Voluntary
Compliance Signed

10

Substantive Lawsuits
consent orders without restitution
default judgments
restitution
dismissal
Total

7
5
6
14
32

Total

100% (N

98)

This brief examination of the bases for disposition of litigation matters makes it clear that cases frequently are dismissed
on the basis of restitution. The litigation department, which
embodies the law enforcement stance of the Bureau, thus leans
heavily toward a dispute settlement stance. Many lawsuits and
investigations are closed on the basis of restitution, with or
without additional sanctions. In sum, the litigation department
does not make much use of the formal lawsuit, but deals with
businesses mainly in less formal and less public ways. Although
it is officially the law enforcement arm of the Bureau, in fact
the litigation department functions, like the hearing department, with an orientation toward the settlement of two-party
disputes rather than toward prosecution and the imposition of
sanctions.
911Matters which were investigated but not acted upon are omitted. This table
is based on cases closed during 1972 in order to analyze outcomes. Table XIV is based
on cases initiated during 1972. Hence the percentages shown in Tables XIV and XV
differ.
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F. The Outcomes of PrivateDisputes
The outcomes of private disputes resulting from Bureau
action are summarized in Table XVI in terms of how many
complainants obtained complete, partial, or no solution to the
problems stated in their complaints. The distinction between
complete and partial solutions is subjective, because many complainants obtained remedies that appear to an outsider to solve
completely the stated problems but that differ from the remedies
they requested. 91 By describing the outcomes of the disputes in
terms of the complainants' requests I do not mean to imply
that all complainants are entitled to the relief from the sellers
that they claim. Rather, the complaint is the only available benchmark against which to measure the effect of Bureau action on
the relative positions of buyer and seller. To attempt to judge
further the meaning and equity of various outcomes would be
an unwarranted, or at least futile, attempt to second-guess the
judgment of the complainant and the Bureau.
TABLE XVI

OUTCOMES OF PRIVATE DxsruTEs'
Outcome of Complainant's
Problem as a Result
of Bureau Action

Complete solution
Partial solution
No solution

2

Percentage of
Cases Where
Bureau Acted

39%
31
30
100%
(N'= 210)

Percentage of
Total Sample

17%
11
72
100%
(N = 449)

What substantive solutions were achieved? What actions did
the sellers take in response to Bureau contact? Table XVII shows
the distribution of dispute outcomes in terms of the actions
taken by sellers in response to Bureau contact.
In 38% of the cases (restitution, 22%, plus performance,
16%) the seller took affirmative action to complete the transaction as originally conceived by the buyer. An additional 10%
of the transactions were canceled entirely. The actions resulting from Bureau intervention were various, especially when
9' See Table XVIII injfa.
92 N' omits cases where the Bureau did not contact the seller (211) and where
the outcome of the dispute could not be determined (35).
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TABLE XVII
SELLER ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO BUREAU INTERVENTION

R estitution ..........................................................................
Performance of incomplete transaction .........................
Replacement or repair of defective merchandise ............
Cancellation of contract ...............................................
Adjustment of erroneous debt .......................................
N one ................................................................................

93

22%
16
12
10
6
34
100% (N = 210)

compared with formal court judgments which are limited primarily to the payment of money.
By comparing the types of action taken by sellers in response to Bureau contact with the type of seller action requested
by complainants, several aspects of the effect of Bureau action
can be seen. As Table XVIII demonstrates, complainants most
frequently obtained relief when they specified the relief they
were seeking-although they did not always obtain what they
specified. Apparently those problems which can be and are defined by the complainant as remediable by specified seller
action are solved more readily. Complainants seeking cancellation of transactions and adjustment of erroneous debts most
frequently obtained not only relief, but also the type of relief
TABLE XVIII
RFMEDIES REQUESTED COMIPARED WITH REMIEDIES OBTAINED BY COMPLAINANTS04

Remedy Requested
Completion of
Performance,
Remedy
Obtained

Remedy Requested
Alternative Remedy
No Remedy

'Some

Repair or
Replacement

52%
16
32
100%
(N = 49)

Adiustment of
Restitution

35%
38
27
100%
(N = 82)

Erroneous Debt
or Cancellation

77%
8
15
100%
(N = 25)

Unspecified

59%0
41
100%
(N = 42)

remedy.

93 Cases where the Bureau did not contact the seller (211) and where outcome
cannot be determined (35) are omitted.
' Total N = 198. Cases where seller was not contacted (211), where no private
remedy was requested (37), and where outcome could not be determined (35) are
omitted.
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they requested. After cancellation, completion of performance
was most frequently obtained when requested. Bureau action
was most effective in obtaining cancellation or completion of
performance when requested, and was much less effective in
obtaining restitution. There was a definite tendency to shift
to alternative remedies when restitution was requested, more
so than when remedies other than restitution were requested.
The Bureau thus appears to function most effectively as an expeditor of transactions that can be salvaged and much less effectively when transactions are beyond repair and can only be
terminated, with restitution.
The outcomes of disputes resulting from informal hearings and from Bureau contact with sellers by letter are distinctly
different. Although the proportion of complainants obtaining
some relief is almost the same, the nature of the relief is quite
different, as Table XIX demonstrates. Partial or compromise
solutions are much more likely to occur as a result of hearings,
and the vast majority of complete solutions result from letter
contacts. Two very different processes are being used. The process of letter contact is much more likely to call forth an all-ornone response and to resolve clear cases. The hearing process
is used only for those more difficult or uncertain disputes not
solved by letter contact and is more likely to result in a compromise or partial solution.
TABLE XIX
TYPE OF BUREAU INTERVENTION AND RELIEF OBTAINED

Letter Contact

Complete solution
Partial solution

No solution

•44%
25

5

Hearing

24%
48

31

28

100%
(N = 157)

100%
(N = 53)

Almost all (97%) of the complaints over which jurisdiction
was taken where seller had not performed at all were disposed
of without hearing, as compared to 63% of other cases. Disputes over the quality of goods or services, being more difficult
95 Cases where Bureau did not contact seller (211) and where outcome could
not be determined (35) are omitted.
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to resolve and more likely to result in compromise, more often
went to hearing.
What types of seller responses occur as a result of the two
processes? As Table XX demonstrates, completion of performance of a transaction and contract cancellation more frequently
resulted from letter contact, while replacement, repair, and restitution more often resulted from hearings. "No solution" outcomes resulted almost equally from letter contact and hearings.
TABLE XX

TYPE

OF BuREAu INTERVENTION AND TYPES OF RELIEF OBTAINED

.Performance completed
Cancellation
Restitution
Repair or replacement
No relief

Letter Contact

Hearing

19%

14%

19
20
10
32

8
31
18
29

100%
(N = 151)

100%
(N = 51)

6

The preceding discussion of complaint outcomes is based
on data collected from the Bureau's complaint files. One problem arises from the use of such data. As we have seen, the Bureau disposes of cases on the basis of the seller's promise to act
or reports that the seller has acted. But just as some defendants
do not pay court judgments, some sellers do not follow through
on settlements offered. Similarly, some complainants are not
satisfied with the settlement on the basis of which the file was
closed.
Forty-two complainants were interviewed. The Bureau's
complaint files showed that 26 of these 42 complainants had
obtained part or all of what they requested. But only 21 of the
complainants interviewed said that they had obtained any of
what they requested. In 5 cases out of 26, the Bureau's files
thus showed relief for complainants where the complainant
said none had been obtained. It is difficult to interpret these
responses. In 3 of the 5 cases the dispute simply continued after
Bureau action had been completed. In 2 of the 5 cases the seller
6Cases where Bureau did not contact seller (211) and where type of relief
could not be determined (43) are omitted.
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had offered the buyer a compromise which the buyer found
unacceptable before the buyer complained to the Bureau; the
seller had offered the same compromise at a hearing and the
complainant again found it unacceptable. Although the seller
offered some relief, the dispute was not settled. One complaint
involved a faulty automobile. The complainant, obviously, wanted
it to run properly. The seller agreed to repair it and tried but
did not do so successfully; he then did nothing more. The seller
thus did something in response to the complaint but did not
completely fix the car. On the basis of the seller's agreement to
repair the car, however, the Bureau's file was closed. It is difficult to say that the seller did not comply with his agreement
with the Bureau, but it is equally difficult to say that the settlement contemplated at the closing of the file actually took place.
This case is atypical, but in its own way each Bureau case is atypical. In only one of the cases where the agreement was not carried out did the settlement involve the payment of money by
the seller to the complainant. In such a case it is more appropriate to say that there was a breach of an agreement by seller.
Some Bureau complainants have a problem parallel to that
of court plaintiffs with unsatisfied judgments in their favor.
Like a court, the Bureau does not monitor settlements to determine whether or not sellers actually perform. The Bureau's
rationale for failing to follow up on settlements is that complainants will notify the Bureau if the seller defaults and the
Bureau can then reopen the matter. But many complainants
do not contact the Bureau again; of the five complainants we
interviewed who were in this situation, none had contacted
the Bureau again. Their attitude seemed to be that n6thing
would be accomplished because the Bureau had done all it could
do. All five were frustrated and angry at both the seller and the
Bureau, felt the Bureau had not been of much help, and seemed
resigned to the fact that no relief would be forthcoming. Moreover, the Bureau is quite unlikely to take further action when a
seller fails to perform on a settlement agreement, even when
this is called to the attention of the Bureau.
Only nine complainants (2% of the sample) contacted the
Bureau to report that a seller had not performed a promised
settlement. In only four of these cases did the Bureau write the
seller again to demand performance of its offered settlement. In
only one case did the Bureau go further and hold a hearing. In
the other five cases, the Bureau simply filed the letter without
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acknowledgment or further action. Where complainants do
not report the seller's noncompliance to the Bureau, therefore,
they may be correct in sensing that the Bureau has exhausted
both its power and its will to obtain relief. The hearing officers
express similar resignation, explaining that they have no power
to force a seller to do anything. If the seller fails to perform
"voluntarily," they say there is nothing more they can do; after
they have tried to settle the matter, they must simply leave the
parties where they found them and go on to other cases where
the Bureau's resources may be more fruitfully used-the solvability standard in action.
G. Complainant Evaluation of the Bureau
Dissatisfaction with and even hostility toward the Bureau
were widespread among those complainants interviewed.9 7 Asked
whether they would complain to the Bureau again should they
have another consumer grievance, 19 said yes and 23 said no.
Even among those who said they would return to the Bureau,
there was much dissatisfaction with the Bureau as being too
slow, unaggressive, biased, disorganized, and "bureaucratic."
But, as many admitted, they knew of no other place to go for
help.
Whether the complainants said they would use the Bureau
again clearly is related to whether they obtained relief satisfactory
to them. Of the 23 complainants who said they would not use
the Bureau again in a similar case, 7 had obtained a partial solution and 16 had obtained nothing. Of those obtaining a partial
solution (14), 50% said they would not return to the Bureau.
Of those obtaining no relief (21) 76% said they would not use
the Bureau again. Attitudes toward the Bureau thus vary with
the outcome of the case. Many of those who expressed dissatisfaction with the Bureau (67%) were vehement about it. Three
complainants said the hearing officer must have been bribed.
One said the Bureau had written to the wrong business in his
case. Several said hearing officers were incompetent at hearings
and did not understand the situations. Several made a general
evaluation of the Bureau as incompetent and ineffective. On
the other hand, as might be expected, 10 out of 11 of those who
said they were satisfied or somewhat satisfied said that the Bu91 The cases of the complainants interviewed were evenly divided between hearing and nonhearing dispositions.
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reau had done a good, if slow, job, and that they would use the
Bureau again.
V.

THE ROLE OF THE BUREAU

The Consumer Fraud Bureau does not operate primarily
at the formal level of quasi-criminal law enforcement envisioned
in its empowering statute, ferreting out and punishing the hard
core of dishonest businesses. The Bureau's primary functioning is instead at a more informal level of problem solving and
concrete dispute resolution. The dominant stance of the Bu98
reau is dispute settlement.
The Bureau's stance has shifted in the course of a decade
(or perhaps it shifted in the process of implementing the statute
and setting up the Bureau) from "rid[ding] the State of merchants
who habitually employ fraud" by law enforcement to "righting
the wrong and recovering the individual's money whenever
possible" by acting as the legal representative of the consumer. 9 9
98 The problem-solving and law enforcement stances of the Bureau are analogous
to the "service style" and "legalistic style" of police behavior described by Wilson.
In the Bureau, as in the police departments Wilson describes, one stance or style
predominates but does not completely displace the others. There is law enforcement (legalistic style behavior) even in institutions dominated by problem solving
(service style behavior). J.

WILSON,

VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR

172-83, 200-01

(1968).
'" The Bureau was set up over a decade ago. The first report of the attorney
general after the Bureau was created described the Act and the attorney general's
functions under it as follows:
The law is designed to rid the State of Illinois of merchants who habitually
employ fraud, deception and misrepresentation in connection with the
sale of merchandise, real estate and services.
Under this Act it is the duty of the Attorney General to investigate
unlawful practices and he has the power to require written statements and
reports, to examine witnesses under oath, to examine merchandise and
records, and to impound and retain merchandise and records pursuant to
order of court. To carry out his duties, the Attorney General is authorized
to issue subpoenas, administer oaths, conduct hearings, prescribe forms,
promulgate rules and regulations, and to institute legal proceedings including actions to obtain injunctions and the appointment of receivers.

1962 ILL. ATT'y GEN. REP. 8.

In contrast to this description of the Bureau contained in the first attorney general's report, a recent report describes the Bureau in this way:
The Attorney General's division of Consumer Protection battles fraudulent,
deceptive and unfair business practices throughout Illinois. To supplement our principal offices in downtown . . . branch offices have now been
established the length of the state . . . as well as in the low income sectors
[of the city], in the Spanish-speaking community, and in the suburbs. . ..
Thus, any citizen who feels that he has been duped or wronged in a consumer transaction can file a complaint with the Attorney General, who then
becomes the face-to-face legal representative of the citizen in righting the
wrong and recovering the individual's money whenever possible.
[1971-1972] ILL. A-rT'y GEN. REP. & Op. xxii.
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The Bureau functions mainly as a community resource giving
direct help to consumers with problems. In effect, the Bureau
is providing specialized legal services to the public on a no-fee
basis. Most of the cases the Bureau handles are too small to
justify the cost of hiring a private lawyer. Some cases were referred to the Bureau by lawyers. The chief of the Bureau articulated this conception of the Bureau as a community resource
and advocate for the public while explaining his reasons for
limiting our access to the Bureau's hearings and "clients." He
said that he was afraid that if the public knew he had allowed
outsiders to see complaints, they would no longer bring their
problems to the Bureau with the same trust and confidence
as they would take them to their own lawyers; he also invoked
the lawyer-client privilege with respect to the confidentiality
of the Bureau's files.
The surface Bureau rhetoric, used by all personnel, is that
law enforcement is the mission of the Bureau and that the litigation department is where the "action" is. The chief of the Bureau has said, "We've got jurisdiction over anything bad in the
way of consumer practices." One litigation attorney told me what
the Bureau does: "We go after the crooks-the real fly-by-night
predators who cause all the trouble. We throw the book at them
and put them out of business or force them out of the state."
Yet this description is not entirely believed even as it is being
stated. The litigation lawyers are disillusioned as to the likelihood that their efforts will have much impact on fraud in the
community. They are intensely aware of the immense practical
difficulties of putting together evidence and witnesses and locating and serving process on businesses, and of the political pressure encountered in trying to take aggressive action. The prevailing attitude is similar to that expressed by Philip Schrag.
My departure from the Department of Consumer Affairs was not a resignation of protest but one of disappointment. Although the Commissioner and the
city had given the Law Enforcement Division all the
political, financial, and legal support that could reasonably be asked (given New York City's proximity to
municipal bankruptcy), we were having little discernible impact on the level of consumer fraud in New York.
To be sure, no one would again be deceived by
Foolproof Protection, or by any of a dozen major frauds
that folded their fine-print contracts as a result of our
investigation and action. But at one time during the
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drafting of the Consumer Protection Law, I had actually
imagined that a good law, properly administered, could
wipe out misleading sales practices altogether. Our
experiences shed little light on whether enough law
enforcement could ever do the job, but they do suggest that given our toleration of the way in which adversary and judicial systems now operate, the amount
of resources constituting "enough" would be more
than any government should devote to the problem.
The government, then, cannot alone be expected
to stop consumer fraud, at least not unless the courts
treat consumer fraud as a serious offense or the public
spends money far in excess of its present appropriations. 10 0
While the Bureau's hearing officers share this disenchantment with the law enforcement approach, they express the
more optimistic feeling that at least individual consumers can
be helped with their problems. The hearing officers deal directly with complaining consumers. They get their hands dirty
in the day-to-day nagging problems that come to the Bureau.
They are continually bombarded by emotional appeals for assistance. Although the facts and issues are rarely clear-cut, it
would be difficult not to respond empathically to such consumer
complaints. The impulse is strong to share the stance of the
consumers wanting help with their problems and to become
their advocates. All complaints present problems that buyers
are having with sellers and call the sellers' conduct into question. Of course, sellers have problems with consumers too, but
these are not the concern of the Bureau and are not brought
there. That the Bureau is structured to deal only with consumers'
complaints against sellers furthers the process of identification
with the consumer and his problems and sensitization to his
interests. One hearing officer noted this tendency to sympathize
with complainants by comparing himself to a doctor: "A doctor
deals with patients every day. Patients tell him their problems
and ask for help. The whole point of being a doctor is to help
patients. Perhaps if more germs hired doctors and complained
about their problems with antibiotics, doctors' attitudes would
be different." Constant exposure to one set of interests has led
to empathy with or "capture" by the expressed problem-solving
I

P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR THE DECEIVED 185-88 (1972).
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needs of consumers, and the Bureau has shifted its stance accordingly-by the same process that regulatory agencies are
often said to be "captured" by those interests they are set up to
regulate.
We have seen that most of the complaints received by the
Bureau do seek direct help with consumer problems. The Bureau's dispute settlement stance is thus the most appropriate
response to the complainants' expressed interests. Once this
stance is adopted, it is self-reinforcing. Experience with and
knowledge of the Bureau's stance shapes the knowledgeable
public's expectations of how the Bureau will respond, and thus
encourages those seeking such a response to use the Bureau.
The Bureau has accepted the definition of itself as a community
problem-solving resource and communicates this role definition in its public appearances and literature. One Bureau pamphlet entitled "20 Ways not to be 'Gypped'" states:
The Attorney General is the attorney of the people as
well as the chief legal officer of the state. Among the
many public services offered by this office is a special
Consumer Protection Division, created to combat deceptive and fraudulent business practices . . . . Any
Illinois consumer who believes he has been treated unfairly in any transaction can receive assistance from
my office.' 0 1
Another pamphlet states:
Every member of the public is a potential victim of
fraud in some unguarded or uninformed moment.
This booklet, therefore, is designed . . . to tell you exactly how the Attorney General's office can help if you
should be made the victim of a fraudulent or deceptive
sales scheme.
ALL OF THIS PROTECTION IS IMMEDIATELY
AVAILABLE TO YOU WITHOUT CHARGE AS ANOTHER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.
How effective is this protection? More than 85,000 members of the public throughout Illinois have been assisted.
And more than $3,500,000 has been recovered for these
citizens. This is money that would have otherwise been
lost through fraud or deception in individual sales. Most
'0' ILL. AT'Y GEN., 20 WAYS NOT TO BE GYPPED 16 (1970).
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of these purchases ranged from $15 to $25 and each involved some form of fraud or deception. 102
The attorney general of the state recently described the
Bureau in this way:
The Consumer Fraud Division processes thousands of consumer complaints about shoddy merchandise, fraudulent sales and repairs and many other consumer related problems.
This is the citizen's tool against the unscrupulous
merchant who
prowls the market place in search of
03
the unwary.'
There is something of a chicken-or-egg dilemma here: has the
Bureau adapted its response to the complaints that it receives,
or has it received the complaints in response to the services that
it offers?
Posed ifn this way, the question is unanswerable. Yet the
dilemma clearly indicates the self-reinforcing process that is
operating. The result is the creation and maintenance of congruence between the demands of the Bureau's clients and the
dispute settlement services that the Bureau offers as a community resource and the consequent minimization of its efforts
at law enforcement.
The dispute settlement services of the Bureau are extremely
informal. They emphasize concrete problem solving to the almost total exclusion of rule creation or announcement. The
settlement process is dominated by a spirit of compromise ("adjustment," not "decision," of disputes) which leads the Bureau
to attempt to facilitate a mediated bargaining process between
the parties rather than to apply fixed rules. No fixed substantive rules are used or created by the Bureau. Formal legal rules
have effect primarily when the Bureau anticipates formal litigation in court. Hearing officers do not announce decisions like
judges; instead they urge solutions to problems. Such solutions
remain confidential and are not consulted as precedent even
within the Bureau. The Bureau has resisted the creation of substantive rules concerning business practices.
12 ILL.

AT'y

GEN.,

YOUR

PROTECTION

AGAINST

FRAUDULENT

TISING, & LOANS (undated).
103 Scott, Law Day Thoughts for Each of Us to Consider, Daily

cago), Apr. 26, 1973, at 5, col. 1.

SALES,

ADVER-

Law Bulletin (Chi-
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The Bureau functions so as to ration its resources and maximize its capacity to respond to concrete problems with problemsolving activity. The trade-off is that the Bureau does not invest
many resources in the more formal activity of law enforcement
and none in rulemaking. 10 4 The solvability criterion serves to
ensure that Bureau resources are used primarily in cases in
which it can solve problems informally. The implicit judgment
is that the Bureau's resources (including its power as a state
agency) are to be spread in small amounts to help as many complainants as possible rather than concentrated on the sellers
who deviate furthest from the legal norms. Those problems
of complainants that cannot be solved with a meager ration of
Bureau resources are typically left for appeal to other (more
formal) institutions if the complainants wish to pursue them.
104 It is this trade-off which has been the focus of critics of Bureau policy. Consumer agencies such as the Bureau, they contend, should limit themselves to enforcing antifraud laws and ignore disputes which do not involve serious fraud; instead of accepting compromises they should hold out for the vindication of all of
the consumers' rights. An example of this line of criticism reads:
The most publicized state agency operating against fraud in consumer
credit is the Consumer Frauds Bureau of the Office of the Attorney General
of New York. This office in its 1966 Report claims to have handled 15,000
consumer complaints in seven years and to have recovered through'mediation and court action $1,000,000 for the public. But its powers in this field
are only to sue to dissolve corporations for fraud and to enjoin persistent
fraudulent practices. There is no criminal offense into which consumer
frauds can readily be fitted.
If one talks to Legal Aid workers in New York, one gets an unflattering
picture of the usefulness of the Attorney General's office in this field. He
is told of persons waiting by the hour to be interviewed, with scant results.
That office has no authority to bring civil suits on behalf of private litigants.
Therefore, if it cannot effect an adjustment by telephone mediation,
it drops the matter and refers the consumer to private counsel or to legal
service offices. It has brought few injunctions against fraudulent practices,
and it is believed that it has not accomplished very much by voluntary stipulations to desist.
Professor Caplovitz took a dim view of the usefulness of the New York
Attorney General's office in a 1968 lecture where he said:
* * * there are now 23 states with Consumer Fraud Bureaus attached
to the Attorney General's office. But such Bureaus turn out to be a mixed
blessing. Unscrupulous companies soon learn that the most that might
happen to them after much litigation is that their license might be suspended.
Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 44-45
(1969) (footnotes omitted).
Such criticism ignores both the positive dispute settlement functions performed
by such consumer agencies and the fact that offering consumers help with their
problems is the only way to encourage them to complain to the agency and that
such complaints are a necessary source of information for the law enforcement
activity of the Bureau.

1186
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Many legal commentators have called for the creation of new
mechanisms for the resolution of consumer disputes. 10 5 The
Bureau has evolved into just such a mechanism. Although its
creators intended the Bureau to enforce antifraud laws, the
Bureau has instead concentrated its resources on solving consumers' problems and informally settling disputes. The Bureau,
created as a relatively formal law enforcement institution, has
come to function primarily as a relatively informal dispute managing institution.
105S. 2928, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 27; Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, supra note 19, at 1132-34. For several recent
surveys of the field, see NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE, REDRESS OF
CONSUMER GRIEVANCES (1973); P. SCHRAG, supra note 49, at 200; Eovaldi & Gestrin,

supra note 19; Jones, Wanted: A New System for Solving Consumer Grievances, 25 ARB. J.
234 (1970); Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality of Justice in the Marketplace: The Need
for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 357 (1972); McGonagle, Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, 27 ARB. J. 65 (1972); Mussehl, The Neighborhood Consumer
Center: Relief for the Consumer at the Grass-Roots Level, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1093
(1972); Rice, supra note 19; Special Committee on Consumer Affairs of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Toward the Informal Resolution of Consumer
Disputes, 27 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 419 (1972); Developments in the Law-Deceptive

Advertising, supra note 19; Comment, supra note 19. See generally Hearings on National
Consumer Protection,supra note 30;Joint Hearings on S. 707 & S. 1160, supra note 30.

